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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20000169-SC

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

TERRIL CALLIHAM,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3X0 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in removing two prospective jurors for
cause?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to dismiss a
prospective juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1232,
1240 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979,114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,
1 58, 20 P.3d 342.

1

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion seeking a
psychiatric evaluation of Misty Ernst, an eyewitness to the murder?
Standard of Review. A trial court's refusal to order that a witness submit to a
psychiatric examination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hubbard, 601
P.2d 929,930 (Utah 1979); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Utah 1984).
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial for the
admission of the redacted confessions of defendant's brother Jordan?
Standard of Review. The decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 20,999 P.2d 7. However, whether testimony is admitted in violation
of a defendant'srightto confront the witnesses against him is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 12,999 P.2d 565 (reviewing for correctness
whether the judge should have returned the jury for further deliberation or declared a mistrial
when juror equivocated during jury polling); State v. Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419, 423 (N.M.
1999) (holding that whether admission of hearsay evidence violates a defendant's rights
under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law). Moreover, where a mistrial motion
rests on an alleged violation of defendant's constitutional rights to confront the witnesses,
the Court will reverse the conviction for any such error unless it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728
(1969).

2

4. Did the trial court commit plain error by reading, without objection, portions of
Misty Ernst's testimony at the jury's request?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews unpreserved claims for plain error. See State
v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910
(1995). However, "if a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from
objecting or has led the trial court into error, [the Court] will then decline to save that party
from error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 497 U.S. 1024,
110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
5. Did the prosecutor's rebuttal argument regarding accomplice liability constitute
prosecutorial misconduct or otherwise warrant reversal of defendant' s conviction for murder?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument for plain error. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah
1992); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 30, 992 P.2d 951.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation or application of the following constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules is relevant to a determination of this case: U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-202 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996);
Utah R. Crim. P. 17; and Utah R. Crim. P. 18. The relevant portions of those provisions are
reproduced in Addendum A.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant and his brother Jordan Calliham were charged with murder, a first degree
felony, for the death of James Eaton on April 3, 1999. R. 4, 10, 34. Jordan's girlfriend,
Misty Ernst, was also charged with the murder of Mr. Eaton. See R. 34,52. However, after
agreeing to testify for the State, she was allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of
attempted obstruction of justice. See R. 35, 49, 374: 64-65; R. 368: 6-8. Following a
preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant and his brother over for trial. R. 27-28.l
Defendant filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to require Misty Ernst to
submit to a psychiatric examination. See R. 52, 99. The court denied that motion, finding
no evidence that Ms. Ernst suffered from a mental illness or was otherwise unable to
distinguish realityfromfiction. See R. 61 -64. Defendant also moved to exclude photographs
of the victim at the crime scene and during the autopsy. R. 131. The court denied
defendant's motion with respect to the crime scene photographs, but granted the motion as
to all but two of the autopsy photographs. R. 372:15-19. Only the crime scene photographs
were introduced at trial. See R. 374: 127-28.

Although the information also sought gang and weapons enhancement penalties,
they were never presented to the jury for its consideration. See R. 10; R. 27-28 (refusing
to bind defendants over on gang enhancement penalties); R. 378: 9-12 (observing that the
weapons enhancement was not presented to the jury).
4

Defendant also moved to sever his trial from that of his brother Jordan on the ground
the prosecution intended to introduce Jordan's out-of-court statements. R. 133.2 Although
the motion represented that a supporting memorandum would be forthcoming, none was filed
and no ruling from the court appears on the record. See R. 133. However, in an off-therecord discussion in chambers on the morning of trial, defendant's counsel apparently agreed
to resolve the issues raised in the motion by requiring that Jordan's out-of-court statements
be redacted to omit any reference to defendant. See R. 374: 116.3 Jordan's counsel
apparently objected to that resolution. See R. 374: 116. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the trial court asked defendant's counsel if he wished to move for a mistrial based on the
confrontation issues raised in the prior motion to sever. R. 375: 214. After consulting with
his client, counsel declined. R. 375:215. However, before closing arguments the following
day, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the admission of Jordan's
statements to his cellmates, as well as to Misty Ernst, improperly corroborated Misty's
testimony. R. 375: 9-10. The trial court denied the motion. R. 375: 12-14.
Following the five-day trial, a jury convicted defendant and his brother Jordan as
charged. R. 351,373-77. The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of

2

A previous motion to sever was also filed, alleging that the brothers' defenses
were irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. R. 34-39. The trial court found that
defendant had not shown their defenses were mutually exclusive and thus denied the
motion. R. 49-50. Defendant has not appealed that ruling.
3

The resolution of defendant's motion is reflected in that part of the record where
the court addresses a mistrial motion made by defendant's attorney. See R. 374: 113-21.
5

five-years-to-life and ordered that he pay restitution for funeral expenses incurred by the
victim's family. R. 359-60, 378. Defendant timely appealed. R. 362.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On April 3,1999, Terril and Jordan Calliham murdered 18-year-old James Eaton on
a remote country road east of Monticello, just west of the Utah-Colorado border. R. 374:4041,56;SE13.
* * *

In April 1999, defendant and his brother Jordan were residents of Dove Creek, a
Colorado town about 10 minutes east of the Utah-Colorado border. R. 374: 25; R. 375: 10.
Jordan was still in high school, but his girlfriend, Misty Ernst, was attending a community
college in Dove Creek. R. 374:25-26,65-66. The victim was Jordan's best friend. R. 374:
28,106; R. 375: 25. The three spent a lot of time together, going to lunch nearly every day
and doing drugs whenever they could. R. 374: 28,31,93-94,106. When Jordan suspected
that Eaton had stolen drugsfromhim, Eaton's fortunes took a tragic turn for the worse. R.
374:31-33,97.
An Easter Picnic
On April 3, 1999, the Saturday before Easter Sunday, Jordan and Misty went on a
picnic with Misty's family in Slick Rock, Colorado. R. 374:26-27. They left the picnic near
7:30 that evening, returning to the Calliham home in Dove Creek between 8:00 and 8:15 p.m.
R. 374: 27,100. The two had made plans with defendant to go to Cortez after they returned
from the picnic to buy drugs from one of Jordan's friends. R. 374: 28, 30-31, 34, 66-67.
6

Defendant, however, was not home when the two returned, so they awaited his arrival. See
R. 374: 29-30. In the meantime, Jordan called Eaton, informing him of their plans. See R.
374:100. Eaton's grandfather dropped him off at the Calliham home at 8:30 or shortly after.
R. 374: 29, 86; R. 375: 37-38, 42. Eaton borrowed Misty's car so that he could drive to a
friend's home to get some money. R. 374: 29, 86,100; see also R. 375: 158. While he was
away, Terril returned home and showered. R. 374: 30, 86. Eaton returned ten or fifteen
minutes later. R. 374: 29, 86.
Going to Monticello for Drugs
Just after 9:00, all four left in Misty's car. R. 374: 30, 34, 86; see also R. 375: 167.
However, rather than driving toward Cortez, they traveled west on U.S. Highway 666 toward
Monticello, Utah because Misty believed they could buy drugs cheaper there. R. 374:30-31,
34,36; see also R. 375: 158. On the way to Monticello, Eaton suggested they smoke a joint
of marijuana. R. 374: 35. Jordan, however, whispered to Misty to not let them smoke in the
car because her mother would have the car the next day. R. 374: 34; see also R. 375: 158.
Because Jordan always smoked in the car, Misty found the request odd and concluded that
Terril and Jordan intended to confront Eaton about the stolen drugs and perhaps beat him up.
R. 374: 34-35.
When Misty told Eaton they could not smoke in the car, Eaton suggested they turn
onto Ucolo Road which was approximately one mile inside the Utah border. R. 374:35,123.
Misty did so, and, after driving north some 200 yards, turned around and parked along side
a barbed wire fence near a grove of trees just off the road. R. 374: 35-38. The three men
7

exited the car, but Misty remained as she smoked a cigarette. R. 374: 39; see also R. 375:
158-59. Defendant asked to wear Eaton's coat because it was cold. R. 374: 39. After
defendant put on the coat, he and Jordan walked beyond the fence into the grove of trees
some 60 feet off the road to smoke a joint. R. 374:39,124,163; R. 375: 37; see also R. 375:
163. As defendant and Jordan walked into the trees, Eaton spoke with Misty, asking her to
join them. R. 374: 39; see also R. 375: 159. Concerned that the brothers were going to
"rough up" Eaton and not wanting to be present at the time, Misty declined, insisting that she
wanted to finish her cigarette. R. 374: 39. Eaton questioned the brothers for walking so far
from the car to smoke a joint, but followed them into the trees when they beckoned him to
join them. R. 374: 39-40.
The Murder
After the three men walked into the grove of trees, Misty heard them laughing. R.
374: 40-41. A few minutes later, Misty heard a gunshot. R. 374: 41; see also R. 375: 160.
Fifteen or more gunshots followed in rapid succession. R. 374:41; see also R. 375:160. A
few seconds later, another shot fired. R. 374: 41; see also R. 375: 160. During the volley
of shots, Misty heard the cries of Eaton, asking why they were killing him. R. 374: 56; see
also R. 375:160-61. After the final shot, Misty heard nothing and defendant and Jordan ran
back to the car. R. 374:41-42.
On the way back to the car, Terril cut his knuckles on the barbed wire fence and
Jordan tore a hole in his pants, scratching his leg. R. 374: 57-58,209; see also R. 375: 161.
When Misty asked if Eaton was dead, Jordan responded that "he finished James off in the
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head." R. 374:41-43; c/R. 375:161,166. Jordan related how Eaton tried to shield himself
from the bullets with his hands. R. 374: 59. He also explained that he fired the last bullet
after clearing a jam. R. 374: 43-44; see also R. 375: 164. Terril told Misty that he thought
for a moment he would have to kick Eaton over onto the ground because Eaton did not
initially fall when he shot him. R. 374: 59.
Covering Their Tracks
While they drove back to Dove Creek, Terril told Misty and Jordan to go to Cortez
to establish an alibi. R. 374: 47-48; R. 375: 9-10. Terril would remain in Dove Creek. R.
374: 47-48; R. 375: 9-10. They arrived in Dove Creek between 9:30 and 9:45. R. 374: 48,
86. Just after 10:00, Misty and Jordan set off for Cortez. R. 374: 48, 86. Some ten miles
into the trip, Jordan called Terril on his cell phone to make it appear they were already in
Cortez. R. 374: 49,122. The two arrived in Cortez between 10:30 and 10:45. R. 374: 48,
86. In Cortez, they visited one of Jordan'sfriendsfor approximately 15 minutes. R. 374: 50,
86. After that, they visited Michael Gentry, another of Jordan's friends. R. 374: 50,86,147.
Misty remained in the car while Jordan went inside to speak with Gentry. R. 374: 50. When
Gentry asked Jordan how things were going in Dove Creek, Jordan told him that he had had
some problems, but said he had solved them. R. 374:146-47. As he spoke, Jordan gestured
with his hand as if he were pulling the trigger of a gun. R. 374: 146-47. Before leaving,
Jordan told Gentry to tell anyone who inquired that Jordan was there that night. R. 374:148.
When Jordan returned to the car nearly an hour later, he told Misty he had told Gentry "what
him and Terril had done." R. 374: 50, 86,148.
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The two returned to the Calliham home in Dove Creek some time after midnight. R.
374: 51. There, Misty saw the murder weapons for thefirsttime when Jordan retrieved both
blood-splattered guns. R. 374: 51-52; see R. 375: 93. Jordan cleaned the blood off his gun,
but left the other for Terril to clean. R. 374: 51-52.
Murder Investigation
When Eaton did not return home as expected, his family filed a missing persons report
with the Dolores County, Colorado Sheriffs Office. R. 375: 8. Eaton's disappearance
remained a mystery until a passing motorist spotted hisfrozenbody six days later. R. 374:
130-31,137-38; R. 375: 31, 95.
Autopsy and Firearms Analysis. An autopsy confirmed that Eaton had died from
multiple gunshot wounds to the head, torso, and extremities. R. 375: 81. The autopsy
revealed that at least nineteen bullets penetrated Eaton's body, including a single shot to the
face fired at close range. See R. 375: 75-80, 84. The medical examiner found projectile
injuries to the heart and aorta, both lungs, the liver, the small and large intestine, the right
kidney, and the spine. R. 375: 80-81. He concluded that any one of the four injuries to the
aorta would have caused death. R. 375: 81-82. He also recovered a bulletfromthe base of
the skull, which corresponded to the single entrance wound to Eaton's face. R. 375: 82-84.
Although that bullet did not penetrate the brain, the medical examiner concluded it was
potentially fatal because it caused hemorrhaging around the brain. R. 375: 83-85. The
medical examiner opined that Eaton wasfirstshot just beneath the ribs on his right side. R.
375: 76, 83-84, 89. The final shot was likely to the face. R. 375: 43, 85, 89-90.
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Police recovered twenty-one 9 mm shell casings and parts of four different bullet slugs
within nine feet of Eaton's body. R. 374: 133,138; R. 375: 49. A firearms examiner from
the Utah State Crime Lab confirmed that the casings originated from two different weapons.
R. 375: 52,55. Ten casings were fired from a Smith & Wesson 9 mm Sigma. R. 375: 53-55,
60. The remaining ten casings were fired from a different weapon, but the gun's brand and
model could not be determined. R. 375: 54, 60.4
Police Interviews. Three days after Eaton's body was discovered, a press release
issued indicating that Eaton's body had been discovered beside Ucolo Road and announcing
the joint investigation into his death by the Dolores and San Juan counties' sheriffs' offices.
SE13. Further details surrounding Eaton's death were withheld by the two offices in the
hope it would facilitate the apprehension of the killers. R.375:16-18,21-22,95-96,102-03.
Two weeks later, investigators received a major break in the case when Misty Ernst
finally came forward. On April 27th, Sergeant John Kimball of the Millard County Sheriffs
Office questioned Misty in a tape-recorded interview in Dove Creek. R. 374:154-55,R. 375:
8-9. Misty initially denied knowing anything about Eaton's murder. R. 374: 156. But after
Sgt. Kimball gave Misty a so-called "father/daughter talk about telling the truth," she
intimated for the first time that she knew something about the murder, asking, "What if I so
much didn't see it as I heard it? What if I heard things." R. 374: 157. Sgt. Kimball then
addressed two concerns raised by Misty—her safety and the potential legal consequences she

4

The 21st casing was lost when the fingerprint examiner accidentally spilled the
casings onto the floor. R. 374: 142; R. 375: 58.
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faced for her involvement. R. 374: 157-58. After Sgt. Kimball addressed those concerns,
Misty gave a statement, much of which was corroborated by the evidence already discovered
bypolice. R.374: 158-60; R. 375:9-10,19. Later that day, Misty answered more questions
in a videotaped interview in Monticello. R. 374: 155. Although Misty provided additional
details of the murder during the second interview, her story was largely consistent with that
given in the first interview. See R. 374: 160-66; but see R. 374: 169.
Defendant was twice interviewed by Sheriff Jerry Martin of the Dolores County
Sheriffs Office. R. 375: 11. Defendant claimed he had been hauling hay with a friend on
the evening of the murder until approximately 7:30. R. 375: 12-13. He claimed that after
hauling hay, he went home to clean up before going to another friend's house where he
remained the rest of the evening. R. 375: 13. In interviews with the St. George Police
Department, Terril admitted that on his return trip to Dove CreekfromSt. George at the end
of March, he brought with him at least six handguns, including a Smith & Wesson 9 mm
Sigma semi-automatic pistol. R. 374: 151-52.
Jailhouse Confessions. More than eight months after Eaton's body was discovered,
two of Jordan's cellmates told police that Jordan had admitted to them that he shot Eaton.
R. 374: 185-90, 193-97. Another cellmate told police Jordan admitted that he and his
girlfriend were present when the murder took place. R. 374: 181; R. 389.5

5

The statements to the three cellmates also implicated Terril, but the statements
were redacted at trial to omit any reference to Terril.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Removal ofProspective Jurors. The trial court properly removed prospective jurors
No. 8 and No. 53. Defendant concedes that the prospective jurors' responses to a jury
questionnaire raised an inference of bias. However, he contends that the inference of bias
was rebutted by their later assurances in voir dire that they could judge impartially.
Assurances alone, however, are not sufficient to rebut an inference of bias. Those assurances
must be weighed against the balance of the prospective jurors' voir dire responses. Juror No.
8 was a close personal friend of the defendants' family. Although he believed he could
nevertheless be fair, his voir dire responses revealed the very real conflict he would endure
because of his relationship with the defendant's family. Juror No. 53, an attorney, consulted
one of the defense attorneys on a motion in this case. She also held deeply held opinions
regarding the appropriate proseuction of young offenders and was never able to state, with
any degree of confidence, that she would in fact be able to judge fairly and impartially. The
trial court did not therefore abuse its discretion in removing the two prospective jurors.
In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by their removal. The jury was passed for
cause. Nothing more is required. Requiring reversal whenever a court improvidently
removes a juror would be counterproductive to the Court's long-held policy that trial courts
should err on the side of caution when determining whether a prospective juror should be
removed. Moreover, an improvident removal does not constitute a de facto peremptory
challenge to the other side, nor does it violate a defendant's constitutional right to confront
the witnesses against him as he suggests.
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Request fora MentalExamination. Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing
to order a mental examination of Misty Ernst, who was present at the scene when the victim
was murdered. Ordering a mental examination of a witness is rare and is justified only if a
substantial doubt exists that the witness is not competent to testify—i.e., that she is unable
to perceive, remember, or relate events or does not appreciate the obligation to tell the truth.
This burden is greater than that required to obtain already existing mental health records.
Defendant presented no evidence that Misty had been diagnosed or was being treated
for a mental illness. The only hint of mental illness was Misty5s adoption of counsel's
characterization of her dreams of the victim as hallucinations. No evidence was introduced
explaining what hallucinations are, the possibility that someone like Misty could be suffering
from them, or the effect they may have on a person's ability to perceive, remember, and
relate events. Although Misty's accounts of the events surrounding the murder differed in
some respects, the differences were minimal and adequately explained by Misty's fear of
retribution by defendants and her concern over the consequences of her own involvement.
Moreover, Misty's account of the murder was substantially corroborated by evidence
gathered by police unknown to the public.
Jordan's Redacted Admissions. Defendant abandoned his motion for severance,
agreeing instead to the admission of Jordan's redacted statements to cellmates which omitted
all reference to defendant. He cannot therefore challenge any failure of the court to sever the
brothers' trials on that ground.
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For the same reason, defendant was precluded from relying on the admission of
Jordan's redacted statements as a ground for mistrial. In any event, those redacted statements
comported with established Supreme Court precedent. Accomplice confessions directly
inculpating a defendant cannot be admitted into evidence in a joint trial. However, those
admissions can be admitted against the accomplice in the same trial if they are redacted to
omit all reference to the defendant and the jury is given an appropriate limiting instruction.
That was done here. Misty Ernst's testimony of a statement by Jordan, which arguably
inculpated defendant, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Re-reading of Some Testimony. When the jury sent a second note to the judge
requesting a transcript of a portion of Misty's testimony, the trial court decided to read the
relevant portions to the jury. Because defendant did not object, he waived any challenge
thereto on appeal. Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails. The rules of evidence do not
forbid a courtfromre-reading portions of a witness's testimony. That authority lies within
the discretion of the trial court. The trial court here correctly determined what testimony the
jury requested and re-read that testimony. Any failure to sua sponte include additional
testimony was harmless.
Prosecutor's Argument on Accomplice Liability. In his rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor argued, without objection, that defendant could be found guilty as an accomplice.
Contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the prosecutor's argument implied that defendant
could be convicted without the requisite intent for murder or for simply being present during
the murder. In any event, any arguable misstatement by the prosecutor was not obvious, nor
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was it prejudicial. Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider any statements by
counsel as evidence. For the same reasons, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim also fails.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REMOVED TWO PROSPECTIVE
JURORS FOR CAUSE
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in removing for cause prospective
jurors No. 8 and No. 53. Aplt. Brf. at 36-59. He contends their removal was not warranted
because both jurors satisfactorily responded to the voir dire inquiries regarding their
expressed biases. Aplt. Brf. at 45-52.6 He further argues that he was harmed by their
removal because it "effectively gave the prosecutor two additional peremptory challenges."
Aplt. Brf. at 52-59. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WAS NOT
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF REASONABILITY,

"Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused
therightto a fair and impartial jury." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 36, 24 P.3d 948 {citing
U.S. Const, amend. VI & Utah Const, art. I, § 12). Thus, "based on the juror's expressed
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court must determine by a process of logic and
reason, based upon common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of

6

The transcript of the voir dire of the two prospective jurors is reproduced in
Addendum B.
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indifference between the state and the accused." State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah
1981). Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, identifies fourteen specific circumstances
upon which a juror may be challenged for cause. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e). For example,
prospective jurors may be removed if they harbor beliefs or attitudes that will prevent them
from acting impartially. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(13), (14). Bias will also be found if the
juror is related to the victim or has a relationship with a party or witness which compromises
his or her ability to judge impartially. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(3), (4).
In assessing whether a prospective juror should be removed for cause, the trial court
applies the following test:
Once comments are made which facially raise a question of partiality or
prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed
by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the
inference rebutted; rebuttal of such an inference may be accomplished by a
showing that the statement was merely the product of a "light impression" and
not one that would "close the mind against the testimony that may be offered
in opposition."
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) {quoting Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah
1980)); accord Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 27. Moreover, "[w]hen a prospective juror expresses
an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an impartial verdict
cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah
1987).
In reviewing a trial court's removal of a prospective juror, the reviewing court
"look[s] to the entire voir dire exchange with the challenged juror." State v. Lajferty, 2001
UT 19, f 58,20 P.3d 342. As with other fact sensitive determinations, the trial judge is in an
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"'advantaged position in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors.'"
Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 25 {quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981)).
Accordingly, "the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the
qualifications ofjurors." State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799,802 (Utah 1977); accord Wach 2001
UT 35, at f 25 (affording the judge's decision "just deference"). That discretion, however,
is measured against "the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the simple
expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to
question." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,151,992 P.2d 951. Thus, a trial court's removal
of a prospective juror will be deemed an abuse of discretion only if it "'was beyond the limits
of reasonability." State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah) {quoting State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992)), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 476
(1993).
1. The Trial Court Properly Removed Prospective Juror No, 8.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in removing prospective juror
No. 8, a close friend of the defendants' family. Aplt. Brf. at 49-52. Defendant asserts that
although juror No. 8 conceded that his relationship with the defendants' family may be
affected by his service, it was error to remove him because of his expressed commitment to
the principle that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Brf. at 50-52.
A review of the court's voir dire reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Rule 18 provides that a challenge for cause is proper if a social relationship exists
which, "when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective
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juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism."
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). Prospective juror No. 8 revealed in the responses to his jury
questionnaire that he was "close personal friends" with defendants' paternal and maternal
grandparents. See R. 373: 52; see also R. 370:16-17. He also said he could not be impartial
because of hisfriendshipwith the family. R. 373: 52. Juror No. 8's friendship with the
family, and his initial expression that it would hinder his ability to be impartial, raised an
inference of bias requiring removal or rehabilitation. See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
Further inquiry did not dispel the suggestion of bias. When asked whether his
relationship with the family would make it impossible to be fair to both sides, juror No. 8
responded, "I think that I could be fair, but I think that I would have a very hard time [ ]
serving in that capacity." R. 373: 52. The court then asked whether it would simply make
him "really uncomfortable," to which he responded that that was "basically it." R. 373: 52.
When the court asked if he would hesitate tofinddefendants guilty—grandchildren of close
personalfriends,juror No. 8 responded:
I would hesitate, yes. But beyond a reasonable doubt, I think that the courts
are set up that way and that's what I believed all my life. If it was beyond a
reasonable doubt, then I think that I would have to.
R. 373: 52-53. Upon further inquiry, juror No. 8 said he would think twice no matter who
was being tried. R. 373: 53. The court then asked whether it would be irrelevant to him that
he knows the grandparents, to which he replied:
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Basically and honestly I think that it might affect me in the very long run either
way. That's why I put that on the questionnaire. I know these people.
They're my friends. There's a difference from between to me of being
somebody else's friend and their being my friend. I consider them my friends.
R. 373: 53-54. In other words, juror No. 8 acknowledged that his service on the jury would
affect his relationship whether he voted to convict defendants or acquit them. "[W]hen
viewed objectively,... reasonable minds" could have little confidence that prospective juror
No. 8 would be able to set aside hisfriendshipand "return a verdict which would be free of
favoritism." See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4).
Although juror No. 8 later represented he would adhere to the "beyond the reasonable
doubt" standard and be able to convict if the State met that burden, he again conceded that
it would be "difficult." R. 373: 54-55. When the prosecutor asked whether his hesitation to
convict would render him partial or unfair, he responded that he "d[id]n't believe so." R.
373: 56. He explained that if they were his friends, they would understand. R. 373: 57.
However, he then expressed some concern regarding his ability to maintain his convictions
in the face of a hung jury:
One of the things that I have really thought about being in here and sitting
here, I think probably the worst thing that I could think of is if I wasn't
convinced and everybody else was, it would not be fair to the defendants for
me to hang this hearing. I don't think I could do that.
R. 373: 57. After so stating, he talked himself out of any concern that he could not maintain
such a personal conviction:
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I think that everybody in there is going to have to have enough evidence
presented that they will believe beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't think this
is going—in most juries it is very clear cut where you have whether you have
that reasonable doubt or not basically. I have found that, you know, you'll
present much more evidence to or against and so I think that, you know, in
order to be fair and impartial, you have to look at both sides. And I have
thought about that and I think that would be a disservice if I didn't believe that
there was a reasonable doubt to go ahead with the State. If I did believe that
there was a reasonable doubt in my own heart, I would have to rule the other
way. And this is what's gone through my mind since I got this summons.
R. 373: 56-57. Through this exchange, juror No. 8 exposed the real conflict he suffered as
he contemplated his ability to serve impartially given his close friendship with defendants'
family. His insistence that he would not be affected by his friendship, however sincere, was
ultimately not convincing.
This Court addressed a similar situation in Brooks, 563 P.2d at 801, where the trial
court refused to remove two jurors who were close friends of prosecution witnesses.
Although both indicated they could set aside their friendships and serve without bias, the
Court held that "[a] juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence of his friend against the
evidence of strangers and of the defendant so as to strike a balance between them as the law
requires, viz., stand indifferent between the state and the accused." Id. at 801-02. The Court
concluded that the trial court's failure to remove the two jurors was an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 802. In so concluding, the Court held that "[w]here there have been personal
associations, such as the ones here[,] to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced[
] runs counter to human nature. One cannot be deemed indifferent or impartial." Id.
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Likewise here, notwithstanding juror No. 8's sincere commitment to be fair, he could
not reasonably be expected to "remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced" given his
close personalfriendshipwith defendants' family. Id. Prospective juror No. 8's friendship
with defendants' family was not one that could easily be set aside. It was not a passing
acquaintance, but a close personal friendship. The effect his service would have on his
relationship could not be discounted. See R. 373: 53-54. Juror No. 8fs discomfort in serving
as a juror "went beyond the discomfort that many jurors experience when rendering
judgment." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 50. As such, the Court was duty bound to remove
him. See id.
2. The Trial Court Properly Removed Prospective Juror No. 53.
Defendant also complains of the trial court's removal of prospective juror No. 53, an
attorney who had served as opposing counsel in cases involving both the prosecutor and
Jordan's attorney. Aplt. Brf. at 45-49; R. 373: 172-74,178. Defendant argues that she was
qualified to serve as a juror because she honestly revealed her potential biases, but indicated
she could nevertheless act impartially. Aplt. Brf. at 46-47. A review of the entire voir dire
exchange reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing her.
Consulting Defense Counsel on a Motion. Rule 18 makes the existence of any legal,
business, or other relationship between a prospective juror and any party a ground for
removal if the "relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free
of favoritism." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4). Juror No. 53 revealed that she had discussed a
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change of venue motion in this case with Jordan's attorney. R. 373:172. Although they did
not discuss the "specifics" of the case, she gave Jordan's attorney "some ideas" on how to
proceed. R. 373: 172-73. The court of appeals has observed that "[a] juror's relationship
with a party's legal counsel may be sufficient to raise a question of bias." State v. Cox, 826
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1992). Having aligned herself with defendants' cause, however
minimally, juror No. 53 placed herself in a position reasonably suggesting that she would be
unable to return a verdict free of bias.
Juror No. 53 was also present in court during several pretrial motions involving
defendants. R. 373: 179. Although she did not recall the issues, facts at trial may have
refreshed her recollection. If the pretrial motions concerned matters that would not go before
the jury, as is often the case, they too could have improperly influenced her decision making.
In short, her familiarity with the case and her assistance to the defense in the case, "would
suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return
a verdict which would be free of favoritism." See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(4).
Concerns Over the Prosecution and Disposition of Young Offenders. A prospective
juror is also subject to removal if "a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent [her]fromacting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging." Utah R. Crim. P.
18(e)( 14). In her response to a jury questionnaire, juror No. 53 wrote she "wouldn't be able
to pass judgment" on the youngest defendant (Jordan) because he would "most likely be
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victimized" in prison. SeeR. 373: 171,116-11.7 Clearly, the consequences of a conviction
have no bearing on whether the defendant is guilty of a crime—the issue before the jury. See
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (observing that jurors should not consider
matters which "suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an
emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror"). As noted
by the court of appeals, "jurors' minds should be free of extraneous thoughts as to possible
sentences because such thoughts would tend to interfere with their concentration on
defendant's guilt or innocence." Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah App.
1990); accord State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,296 (Utah 1988) (observing that the "length
of a possible sentence is generally thought to be irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence"). Thus, juror No. 53's response that she "wouldn't be able to pass judgment" due
to the defendant's youth raised an inference of partiality requiring removal or rehabilitation.
See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
Further inquiry did not rebut the inference of partiality. Although juror No. 53
retreated somewhat from her initial representation that she "wouldn't be able to pass
judgment," her retreat was not far enough. She explained that she thought she "would have
a hard time being impartial, because of his youth." R. 373: 171 (emphasis added). When
again queried about her response, she said, "I've given a lot of thought to this. I think I

7

The responses to the questionnaire are not included in the record on appeal.
However, the substance of some responses are revealed in the voir dire questioning.
24

would have a hard time." R. 373: 171 (emphasis added). The issue was further explored by
defendant's attorney:
Counsel

Are you saying then-let me understand-that you don't think
you could listen to the evidence in this case and listen to
Judge Anderson's instructions and be a fair and impartial
juror?

Juror No. 53

I thought—I think it would be difficult, but I think I would do
that. I certainly do that in other contexts]. In my own
practice of law I do that where I set my feelings aside.

Counsel

A lot of things we do are real difficult to do.

Juror No. 53

Yes.

Counsel

But your statement is that in spite of that difficulty, you could
follow his instruction then you could listen to the evidence
and be a fair and impartial juror to both sides.

Juror No. 53

I think so. I think probably more so in this type of case I
would be fair to both sides.

R. 373:172-73 (emphasis added). These responses did nothing to dispel the concern that she
could not judge impartially. Each time, she equivocated in her confidence that she would
judge fairly and impartially, stating only that she thought she could do so and reiterating that
it would be difficult.
Later in voir dire, she reiterated that "it would be real hard" to pass judgment on
Jordan, explaining that "it's hard to make a decision when someone's sent up and feeling like
a decision against him or making a harsh judgment would [affect] him for the rest of his life."
R. 373: 177. Referring to her response on the questionnaire, she further explained: "I just
tried to indicate anything that I thought might make me not an impartial juror. I don't know
that that would be definitely the way I would go. I think I could listen to Judge Anderson's
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instructions." R. 373: 177. Again her assurances are enveloped in doubt. She could not
even express great confidence that she could follow the court's instructions.
Moreover, prospective juror No. 53 later disclosed that she had seen the two brothers
in court on prior occasions and was "struck by the youth of both." R. 373: 179. Therefore,
her concerns regarding the prosecution of young offenders also extended to defendant. Her
extraneous concerns regarding the treatment of young offenders was further exasperated by
her mistaken belief that defendants faced a term of 15-years-to-life in prison, rather than 5years-to-life. R. 373: 180-81.
When further pressed by Jordan's attorney, juror No. 53 finally indicated that she
would be able to find the defendants guilty if the prosecution proved the case beyond a
reasonable doubt. R. 373: 178. She responded affirmatively when counsel asked her if she
could "absolutely" do so. R. 373: 178. However, as noted above, "[w]hen a prospective
juror expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an
impartial verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of bias." Jones, 734 P.2d at 475;
accord Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884. Although juror No. 53 responded affirmatively to the last
question posed by Jordan's attorney, that was not enough. See Wach, 2001 UT 35, at f 33
(holding "[i]t is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and fair"). "A
statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning
in light of [her] other testimony and facts which suggest bias." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d
533, 536 (Utah 1981).

26

As explained, juror No. 53 consistently maintained only that she thought she could
serve impartially and never retracted her response that it would be "difficult" or "hard" to do
so. Thus, her responses provided no assurance that she would in fact accomplish the
"difficult" task of serving without bias. Prospective juror No. 53 instead revealed deeply
held attitudes, feelings, and opinions that placed in serious question her ability to be fair and
impartial. For example, she acknowledged her disagreement with the prosecutor's approach
to drug cases involving young offenders, believing they should be given a second chance.
R. 373: 174. She then admitted that "it's harder" for her to pass judgment in any case
involving young offenders, though she did not believe that they automatically deserved a
second chance because of their youth. R. 373:174-75. The depth of her feelings was further
revealed in the admittedly "heated" exchanges she had had with the prosecutor over the issue.
R. 373:175-76. She even admitted to having told him that he was "ruining the lives of these
young people" by not giving them a second chance in drug cases. R. 373: 174.
Juror No. 53 expressed her belief that she would be fair "more so in this type of case."
R. 373: 173. Although she did not elaborate on that, she later indicated her understanding
that this case "isn't a drug case." R. 373: 174. However, as a juror, she would have learned
that the State alleged the murder was motivated by drugs. Given her disagreement with the
prosecutor's policy in pursuing young drug offenders and her general rancor towards him,
it is not unreasonable to believe that juror No. 53 would have questioned the propriety of
pursuing first degree murder against these young defendants, rather than a lesser charge.
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Although prospective Juror No. 53 minimized the depth of her rancor towards the
prosecutor over this issue, the trial court suggested that it was significant. After the court
held it would strike her for cause, the prosecutor noted his relief that he would not be
required to comment on their acrimonious relationship. R. 373: 182. In response, the trial
court stated: "Okay. I've been in court and seen the two of you together. Tell her she can
go." R. 373: 182. In other words, the court found from its own experience that the
acrimonious relationship between the two placed in doubt her ability to serve free of bias.
A parallel can be drawn to the challenged juror in State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,992
P.2d 951. In that case, this Court held that a prospective juror who had been sexually abused
by a boyfriend should have been removed for cause in a trial charging a father with sexually
abusing his nine-year-old daughter. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, atfflf2-5, 48. Although the
prospective juror said that sitting as ajuror "'might make [her] uncomfortable,'" she testified
that her experience "'would not affect [her] ability to be fair and keep in remembrance he is
innocent until proven guilty.'" Id. at f 48 {quotingfromthe record). Emphasizing "that trial
judges should err on the side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges," the Court
concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to remove the prospective
juror for cause. Id. at 51. In so concluding, the Court observed:
[D]espite [the prospective juror's] sincere commitment to be fair, it was clearly
possible that her personal traumatic experience might affect her neutrality in
some way because, as she stated, making a decision would make her
"uncomfortable" for reasons that went beyond the discomfort that many jurors
experience when rendering judgment.
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Id. at f 50. Likewise in this case, despite juror No. 53?s sincere commitment to be fair, it was
clearly possible that her personal biases regarding the appropriate pursuit of young offenders
might affect her neutrality in some way because, as she stated, being fair and impartial would
be "difficult" for reasons that went beyond the difficulty that many jurors experience when
rendering judgment.
Before removing juror No. 53, the trial court indicated that it would not remove her
if the prosecutor so desired. R. 373: 182. Defendant argues that it is "rather unlikely" the
court would have given the prosecutor the option of retaining juror No. 53 if it "truly
believed that [she] was unqualified to serve." Aplt. Brf. at 49. As this Court recently
observed, "jury selection is more art than science," and therefore, counsel has "the right to
identify and prefer particular jurors without regard to any particular objective criterion or
philosophy of jury selection." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,ffl[21,23,12 P.3d 92. If a
party chooses to retain a prospective juror "for whom [it] arguably possessed a sufficient
basis to challenge for cause," the trial court does not act unreasonably in respecting that
party's decision. Id. atf 31.
* * *

In sum, the two prospective jurors acknowledged biases that were not attenuated by
further voir dire. Their removal was based on close relationships with those involved in the
case, as well as deeply held attitudes—not "light impressions." See Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
Certainly, it cannot be said that their removal was "beyond the limits of reasonability."
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Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240 (internal quotes omitted). Indeed, the trial court may well have
abused its discretion if had not excused them.
B.

REMOVAL OF THE TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS DID NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in removing the
two jurors, the conviction cannot be reversed unless defendant can show the error was
harmful. Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240. This defendant cannot do.
1. No Biased Jurors Sat on the Jury.
This Court long ago reaffirmed that "it is not reversible error to exclude a juror for an
insufficient cause if an impartial and unobjectionable jury is afterward obtained." State v.
Seyboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225, 228 (Utah 1925) (internal quotations omitted).8 That
holding has never been overruled by this Court. See, e.g, Archuletta, 850 P.2d at 1240
(holding that even if trial court abuses its discretion in granting motion to dismiss a juror for
cause, the reviewing court "will reverse only if [it] find[s] that the error is harmful").
Defendant makes no claim that the jurors who sat were not fair and impartial. See Aplt. Brf.
at 52-59. Indeed, defendant passed each of the sitting jurors for cause. R. 373:70,109,111,
131,140, 194,210,215. This fact is fatal to any claim that defendant was prejudiced by an
improvident removal.

8

The Court added that this is particularly true "where the excepting party has not
exhausted the peremptory challenges to which he is entitled/1 Seyboldt, 236 P. at 228
(internal quotations omitted).
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2. The "Automatic Reversal Rule" Espoused by Defendant Cuts Against
the Policy that Courts Should Err on the Side of Caution.
Defendant asks the Court to presume prejudice for the improvident removal of a
prospective juror. Aplt. Brf. at 56. He thus seeks the adoption of a rule making any
improper removal for cause reversible error. Such a rule is contrary to well-established
precedent and would place an undue and impractical burden on trial judges. The rule
espoused by defendant is similar to the automatic reversal rule once applied by this Court in
cases where the trial court improperly denied a for-cause challenge. Under that rule, reversal
was automatic whenever a defendant was compelled to use a peremptory challenge to remove
a prospective juror whom the trial court should have stricken for cause, but did not. See
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451. This
Court rejected the automatic reversal rule in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). The Court held that "[t]o prevail on a
claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent."
In Menzies, the Court opted to require a showing of actual prejudice, i.e., a biased
juror served, over its history of "straining" to uphold "questionable for-cause determinations"
where the jury was otherwise impartial. Id. at 400. In this way, the Court could more readily
provide guidance to trial courts by condemning a failure to remove a biased juror without
upsetting an otherwise valid verdict by an impartial jury. The Court thus reinforced its longheld policy that trial courts should "obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the
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prospective juror and selecting another." Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536. The Court has recently
reaffirmed that policy, directing trial judges to "err on the side of caution in ruling on forcause challenges." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 51. This expedient applies to prospective
jurors of questionable bias for either the defendant or the prosecution.
In support of an automatic reversal rule, defendant relies on this Court's decisions in
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), and Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d
346 (Utah 1997). Aplt. Brf. at 53-57. The civil plaintiffs in Randle and Carrier were each
suing multiple defendants for negligently causing an automobile accident resulting in death,
Randle, 862 P.2d at 1331-32, or serious injury, Carrier, 944 P.2d at 349. In each case, the
issue on appeal was whether the trial court erroneously granted the defendants separate sets
of peremptory challenges under rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Randle, 862 P.2d
at 1332; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 349-50. In both Randle and Carrier, this Court concluded the
trial court in each case erroneously granted the multiple defendants a three-to-one edge over
the plaintiff in peremptory challenges, rather than a two-to-one edge as permitted under the
"substantial controversy" test. Randle, 862 P.2d at 1333-34; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 353.
Randle and Carrier have no application here. They address a trial court's grant of
peremptory challenges under the rules of civil procedure, rather than a trial court's for-cause
removal of prospective jurors in a criminal trial. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1331-32; Carrier,
944 P.2d at 349-50. Defendant argues that the Randle-Carrier rationale should nonetheless
apply because the alleged for-cause removals had the effect of giving the State additional
peremptory challenges. Aplt. Brf. at 57. Such an approach flies in the face of this Court's
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directive that judges should "err on the side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges."
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, at f 51.
Even under the Randle-Carrier rationale, prejudice is only presumed "when one side
is erroneously given substantially more peremptory challenges than the other." Carrier, 944
P.2d at 354 (emphasis added); accordRandle, 862 P.2d at 1334. In both Randle and Carrier,
this Court concluded the trial court erroneously granted the defendants a three-to-one edge
over the plaintiff in peremptory challenges, rather than a two-to-one edge as permitted under
the "substantial controversy" test. Randle, 862 P.2d at 1333-34; Carrier, 944 P.2d at 353.
In contrast, even if the Court were to consider the two for-cause removals here as peremptory
challenges, that would result in seven total challenges for the prosecution and seven for
defendants. See R. 354-56; R. 373:275. The prosecution, therefore, enjoyed no advantage,
let alone a substantial advantage.
In sum, adoption of defendant's automatic reversal rule would be counterproductive
to the policy of encouraging removal when doubt exists. Knowing that any improvident
removal of a prospective juror would automatically result in reversal, but that failure to
remove a biased juror would result in reversal only upon a showing of actual prejudice, trial
courts would have a greater incentive to include questionable jurors instead of removing
them. This Court should therefore reject defendant's invitation to adopt such a rule.
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C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF THE TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS DID NOT
VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Finally, defendant argues that in erroneously removing the two jurors, the trial court
favored the State by effectively giving it two additional peremptory challenges. Aplt. Brf.
at 52-53. He contends that this violated his rights to due process, equal protection, and the
uniform operation of the laws under the federal and state constitutions. Aplt. Brf. at 52-59.
Defendant's argument is without merit.
Even if one were to accept defendant's theory that an erroneous for-cause challenge
was tantamount to an additional peremptory challenge for the State, his claim fails because
this Court has held that "the forced use of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's
erroneous denial of a for-cause challenge does not violate the Constitution." State v.
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 444 (Utah 1996). The same must hold true for an erroneous
removal. This is because "peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of
an impartial jury and a fair trial." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57, 112 S.Ct. 2348,
2358 (1992); accord Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 444. Therefore, the erroneous removal of a juror
for cause does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT THE STATE'S WITNESS SUBMIT TO
A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
In his second claim on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Misty Ernst, a key witness for the State. Aplt. Brf.
at 59-82.9 Defendant argues that Misty's competency was sufficiently drawn into question,
thus warranting a mental evaluation, because she exhibited signs of mental illness, including
so-called "hallucinations" about the victim after the murder. See Aplt. Brf. at 70-78.
Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A.

STANDARD FOR ORDERING MENTAL EVALUATIONS.

In State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929,930 (Utah 1979), this Court acknowledged the trial
court's authority to order a psychological examination of a witness in a criminal case.
Courts, however, traditionally have been "reluctant to open the door to sanity [examinations]
for witnesses" in criminal trials. United States v. Bloome, 773 F.Supp. 545, 548 (E.D.N.Y.
1991); see also Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.) (noting the "federal courts
reluctance to encumber criminal proceedings with psychiatric examinations of witnesses"),
cert denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 142 (1986); State v. Morant, 701 A.2d 1, 11 (Conn.
1997) (holding that "the discretion to order a[ ] [psychiatric] examination should be exercised
sparingly"); cf. State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. 1982) (holding that trial judge "has
neither statutory authority nor discretionary power to compel an unwilling witness to a
9

The Order Denying Psychiatric Evaluation is reproduced in Addendum C.
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psychiatric examination"). Utah appellate courts have yet to find a trial court's refusal to
order an examination improper. See, e.g., Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 631 (upholding the trial
judge's refusal to order a mental examination); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1196-98
(Utah 1984) (same); State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Utah App. 1990) (same).
"[OJrdering a witness to undergo a psychological examination is a drastic measure."
United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750,755 (8th Cir.) (internal quotes omitted), cert, denied,
516 U.S. 980,116 S.Ct. 487 (1995). This Court long ago recognized that "[t]he question of
a person's sanity nearly always involves considerable delicacy." Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d
378, 381,431 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1967) (addressing a mental examination of a witness in
a civil case under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). In that regard, the Court noted:
If mere allegations . . . compelled the court to require a party to submit to a
psychiatric examination, a way would be opened for opposing parties to
harass, annoy or intimidate each other. The potential for mischief in such a
situation is obvious and the court would always be well advised in exercising
caution and restraint in regard to such a request
Id.
Ordering the psychological evaluation of a witness to a crime—whose involvement
is not by choice—implicates "serious privacy interests." People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347,
369, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 602 (Cal. 2001). Moreover, the injudicious exercise of that
authority may discourage witnesses, who are often victims, from coming forward. See id.
These concerns are compounded by "the many 'dangers' of using psychiatric evidence to
impeach credibility," including the risk that jurors will consider irrelevant evidence or place
too much reliance on the psychiatrist's findings, thereby abandoning their role as the ultimate
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fact finders. Id. These same concerns may also be "pertinent to a court determination of
competence." Id. Finally, ordering such examinations may produce a trial within a trial,
diverting the jury's attentionfromthe defendant's guilt or innocence to tangential issues of
a witness's psyche that are not appropriate for jury consideration.
Against this backdrop, the Court in Hubbard held that a trial court "might" grant such
a request before permitting a witness to testify if the defendant establishes the existence of
"a substantial doubt that [the] witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty
to tell the truth, or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with
reasonable accuracy." Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added); accordLairby, 699 P.2d
at 1197 (citing Hubbard and applying same standard).10
1. Incompetency Is the Touchstone of a Mental Examination.
Under the Hubbard test, therefore, a showing that the witness cannot be believed is
not sufficient. Ordinarily, a witness's credibility can be effectively attacked by pointing out
conditions or circumstances that may have affected the witness's ability to accurately
perceive or remember events, by exploiting discrepancies in prior statements and testimony,
or by introducing reputation testimony or bad acts evidence indicative of dishonesty. When
a witness's credibility is susceptible to attack in this way, as it usually is, a mental

10

Defendant relies on the court of appeals decision in Braun, 787 P.2d at 1343, for
the proposition that rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes trial courts in a
criminal case to order that a witness submit to a mental examination. Aplt. Brf. at 66 &
n.45. This Court has never applied that rule in a criminal case and its applicability in the
criminal setting is questionable since a witness for the State is not "a party or [ ] a person
in the custody or under the legal control of a party." Utah R. Civ. P. 35(a).
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examination of the witness should never be appropriate. See State v. Brown, 69»4 P.2d 587,
590 (Utah 1984) (holding that "questions of credibility and choices between differing
versions of the facts belong properly to the jury"); State v. Shabata, 687 P.2d 785,790 (Utah
1984) (implicitly approving instruction advising the jurors that they are the sole judges of the
facts and have the "responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the value
of their testimony').
Instead, the defendant must make a showing that the witness's very competence is in
doubt—that a question exists as to his or her ability to tell the truth or to perceive, remember,
and relate events with reasonable accuracy. Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930. Utah law provides
that save for a few exceptions, all persons "who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and,
perceiving, can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-24-1 (1996); accordUtoh Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996); Utah R. Evid. 601.11 Absent
some evidence of mental illness or similar incapacity, a showing that a person is not
competent as a witness is improbable. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1217 n. 13 (Utah
1987) (remarking that "[a] witness wholly without capacity is difficult to imagine"), cert,
denied, 484 U.S. 1044,108 S.Ct. 777 (1988); see also Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1198 (concluding
defendant "did not raise a substantial doubt as to [the child victim's] suffering a mental
aberration affecting her veracity"); Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930 (rejecting defendant's claim

11

Rules 605 and 606 make the trial judge and jurors in a trial incompetent to testify
in that trial. Utah R. Evid. 605 & 606.
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trial court should have ordered a mental exam based on his history of drug abuse and crimes
of dishonesty),
2. A "Substantial Doubt" as to Competency Must Be Shown.
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court cited State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,979
P.2d 799, as the most recent pronouncement of a defendant's right to relevant evidence of
a witness's mental condition. R. 62. Defendant correctly points out that the issue in Bakalov
was different than the issue before the trial court in this case. See Aplt. Brf. at 63. Here, as
in Hubbard, the question is whether the court should order a witness with no history of
mental illness to submit to a mental examination. In Bakalov, the issue was whether the
prosecutor violated the defendant's due process right to material, exculpatory evidence by
failing to disclose already existing mental health records indicating the rape victim suffered
from a mental illness. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at 1fl| 28-30.
Although the issues are different, Bakalov is instructive. The Bakalov court observed
that "[ejvidence showing a witness's inability to accurately perceive, recall, or relate events
at issue in a trial may be crucial to establishing the truth." Id. at f 32. Bakalov concluded
that the "[nondisclosure of evidence [of mental illness] that reasonably casts doubt on a
witness's veracity and ability to perceive and recall accurately when the prosecution rests
much of its case on that witness's testimony may result in [reversible error]." Id (emphasis
added). Although the prosecutor in Bakalov did not disclose to defendant the therapist's
opinion that the rape victim suffered from a mental illness, the Court did not find it reversible
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error because the mental illness "was not probative of [the victim's] ability to perceive,
recall, and relate accurately the events of the rape." Id.
Bakalov thus affirms the underlying premise in Hubbard that evidence of a witness's
mental condition is only relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the witness's competency to
testify. A comparison of the two cases also reveals that the burden for obtaining relevant
evidence of a mental illness is different depending on what is sought. It is one thing to
require the production of already existing evidence of a witness's mental condition. It is
quite another matter to require a witness to submit to a mental examination to generate that
evidence. Thus, where records of a mental illness already exist, the prosecutor who is aware
of these records must disclose the evidence if it "reasonably cast[s] doubt" on the witness's
competency to testify. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, at J 32. On the other hand, where, as here, no
such records exist, the court may not compel a mental examination to generate such evidence
unless the facts cast a "substantial doubt" on the witness's competency to testify. Hubbard,
601 P.2d at 930. Accordingly, the burden for obtaining an order requiring a witness to
submit to a mental evaluation is much greater.
3. Ordering a Mental Examination Is Discretionary.
Even when a defendant establishes a substantial doubt as to a witness's competency,
the trial court is not compelled to order the evaluation. Hubbard, 930 P.2d at 930 (holding
that the trial court "might" order a mental examination if a substantial doubt exists as to
competency). The determination to order an examination "rest[s] largely within the
discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 930; accord Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1197. This discretion
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lies not so much in the trial court's advantaged position in weighing witness credibility, as
defendant suggests, see Aplt. Brf. at 62-67, but rather in a reluctance to unnecessarily intrude
into the lives of witnesses. See Stone, 19 Utah 2d at 381, 431 P.2d at 804 (holding that
because the issue of a person's sanity involves considerable delicacy, "the court would
always be well advised in exercising caution and restraint" before granting such a request for
a mental examination). Accordingly, a trial court's determination to order a mental
evaluation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of its discretion. Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930;
accord Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1197.
B.

A SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT DID N O T EXIST ABOUT MISTY ERNST'S ABILITY TO
PERCEIVE, REMEMBER, AND RELATE EVENTS WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY.

The trial court found no evidence that Misty suffered from a mental illness, either
before or after the murder. R. 63. To the contrary, the court found that Misty was able to
distinguish reality from fiction. R. 63. Defendant complains that whether Misty suffered
from a mental illness was not the issue before the court. Aplt. Brf. at 62-67. However,
because he alleged in his motion that Misty suffered from a mental illness, claiming she was
"emotionally unstable" and she "hallucinates," he brought that issue squarely before the
court. JCR. 58-59; see also JCR 69-70. Moreover, as stated above, defendant must show
much more than a predilection to lie. He must show that Misty's very ability to perceive,
remember, and relate events with reasonable accuracy was in substantial doubt. See
Hubbard, 601 P.2d at 930. As stated, absent some evidence of mental illness, such a
showing is difficult to imagine.
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1. No Evidence Suggested Misty Ernst Suffered from a Mental Illness
Before or at the Time of the Murder Which Would Affect Her Ability
to Perceive and Remember the Events of That Night.
No evidence was introduced indicating that Misty had been treated or otherwise
diagnosed with a mental illness before the murder. SeeR.36S: 1-186. Defendant argues that
the following alleged facts support his claim that Misty suffered from "questionable mental
health" before the crime: (1) Misty, as an adult, initiated a sexual relationship with Jordan,
a minor; (2) Misty placed her drug use over her child; (3) Misty placed her relationship with
Jordan over her child; and (4) Misty was addicted to marijuana and methamphetamine. Aplt.
Brf. at 72. This argument was not raised below and is therefore waived. See Crooks ton v.
Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,800-01 (Utah 1991) (holding argument not raised in trial
court was waived on appeal).
In any event, poor judgment alone does not prove a mental illness, nor does it raise
a substantial doubt as to the witness's ability to perceive, remember, or relate events with
reasonable accuracy. See State v. Billingsley, 736 P.2d 611,613 (Ore. App. 1987) (holding
poor judgment does not establish a mental illness); Bundy v. Dugger, 675 F.Supp. 622, 627
(M.D. Fla. 1987) (same), ajfd, 850 F.2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988). Likewise, this Court has
rejected the claim that drug abuse warrants a mental examination. See Hubbard, 601 P.2d
at 930 (rejecting claim that trial court should have ordered mental examination based on
witness's history of drug abuse and crimes of dishonesty). Moreover, while Misty may have
had one or two beers earlier that day at the picnic, nothing suggested she was high on either
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alcohol or drugs that night. See R. 374: 107-08. Indeed, she was the only one of the four
who did not smoke a joint on Ucolo Road. R. 374: 39.
In sum, no evidence was introduced creating a doubt, much less a substantial doubt,
that Misty was unable to perceive the events of that night.
2. No Evidence Suggested Misty Ernst Suffered from a Mental Illness
after the Murder Which Would Affect Her Ability to Remember and
Relate the Events of That Night
(a) "Hallucinations"
As observed by the trial court, "the only hint of mental illness [after the murder] is the
adoption by [Misty] of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams as hallucinations."
R. 63. Defendant did not introduce any evidence indicating that Misty had been treated or
otherwise diagnosed with a mental illness after the murder. See R. 368: 1-186. He instead
points to Misty's so-called "hallucinations" of the victim after the murder as evidence that
Misty presently sufferedfroma mental illness that affected her ability to remember and relate
the events of that evening. That Misty suffered from hallucinations in any medically
significant way is nothing more than the unqualified speculation of defendant.
To support his contention that Misty sufferedfromhallucinations, defendant relies on
Misty's testimony during cross-examination at the preliminary hearing:
Counsel

. . . [Y]ou told [police] things that you knew because you heard
in Dove Creek and not because you'd observed it personally,
yes?

Misty Ernst

Yeah. Well, a lot of it too was just what was in my head. I
mean, I guess somebody has to go through it to know because I
saw lots of stuff after he was already gone.
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Counsel

What kind of stuff did you see, Misty?

Misty Ernst

I saw James. I mean, I saw James every night.

Counsel

What do you mean when you say you saw him? You dreamt
about it—

Misty Ernst

*Yeah.

Counsel

he came back to see you?

Misty Ernst

He came back to see me and was telling me—

Counsel

Do you recognize now that these things were hallucinations?

Misty Ernst

Yeah.

Counsel

When you had these hallucinations, you thought they were true?

Misty Ernst

Yes.

Counsel

Have you had some hallucinations about being there at the
scene—

Misty Ernst

Yeah.

Counsel

Where James was shot?

Misty Ernst

Uh-huh.

Counsel

And when you talked to the police officers, did you tell them
things that were part of your hallucinations?

Misty Ernst

Well, I was telling them my halluc—whatever—

Counsel

Hallucinations?

Misty Ernst

Yeah.

Counsel

Did you tell them that?

Misty Ernst

No, because I thought that was what was happening until I got
in jail.

R. 368: 59-60 (emphasis added). The trial court correctly observed that Misty did not
describe her experiences as hallucinations, but adopted defense counsel's characterization
of them as such. R. 63. In fact, when counsel asked if what she told police included her
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"hallucinations," Misty balked at that characterization: "Well, I was telling them my
halluc—whatever—."

R. 368: 60.

Misty also adopted defense counsel's initial

characterization of these images as dreams, and she never said anything to discourage that
characterization. See R. 368: 59-60.
Described in her own terms, Misty explained that "a lot of [what she told police] too
was just what was in [her] head." R. 368: 59. She said the victim came back to her every
night and that she saw him at the scene. R. 368: 59-60. Reference to their occurrence at
night supports their characterization as dreams, or perhaps more aptly, nightmares. These
experiences also could be characterized as the inevitable images and thoughts conjured up
in Misty's mindfromreliving and imagining the events of that evening. Defendant did not
introduce any expert testimony explaining what hallucinations are, the possibility that
someone like Misty could be sufferingfromthem, or the effect they might have on a person's
ability to remember and relate events. Defendant's claim thus falls short.
Defendant attempts to make up for that deficiency by citing to, and including in his
addendum, excerptsfromthe American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1995) ("DSM-IV") and to the Drug Enforcement
Agency's website on marijuana and methamphetamine abuse. Aplt. Brf. at 72-73 &
Addendum, Tab 3 (pp. 33-53). None of these authorities were presented to the trial court.
Nevertheless, relying on that evidence, defendant speculates that Misty's so-called
hallucinations could be symptomatic of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, psychoses, drugrelated schizophrenia, or other chronic drug abuse. Aplt. Brf. at 72-73.
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The law is well-settled that "[a]n appellate court's 'review is . . . limited to the
evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, f7,974 P.2d 279
{quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)) (ellipsis
in original); accord In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 862 (Utah 1996) (noting that "reviewing
court[s] will not take new evidence"). As such, "an appellant's addendum may not consist
of evidence that is outside the record on appeal." Pliego, 1999 UT 8, at f 7. This Coun
should "therefore strike this extraneous evidence and [should] not consider it for purposes
of this appeal." Id.
Moreover, defendant uses the DSM-IV as if the diagnosis of a mental illness was as
simple as matching a few symptoms with the corresponding disorder. Use of the DMS-IV
in that manner is wholly contrary to the parameters placed on its use by the American
Psychiatric Association. The manual expressly provides that its use should be limited to
those with the appropriate training and experience in diagnosing and treating mental illness:
The diagnostic categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are meant to be
employed by individuals with appropriate clinical training and experience in
diagnosis. It is important that DSM-IV not be applied mechanically by
untrained individuals. The specific diagnostic criteria included in DSM-IV are
meant to serve as guidelines to be informed by clinical judgment and are not
meant to be used in cookbook fashion.
DSM-IV, at xxiii. Defendant uses the manual in just that fashion and invites the Court to do
the same. This Court should decline the invitation.
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(b) Varied Accounts
Defendant argues that Misty's differing accounts of the murder support his claim that
her so-called hallucinations or drug abuse compromised her ability to perceive, remember,
and relate events with reasonable accuracy. See Aplt. Brf. at 73-77 & nn.51-52. However,
a review of Misty's varied accounts of the murder does not reveal an inability to distinguish
reality from fantasy.
Initial Questioning by Sheriff Martin. Not surprisingly, Misty told Sheriff Martin
that she knew nothing about Eaton's whereabouts when she was questioned the day after the
murder. R. 368: 58-59. Misty had a genuine fear that she would be put to death if she was
linked to his murder. R. 368: 102. She was also Jordan's girlfriend and wished to protect
him. R. 368: 13,101. Thus, when Sheriff Martin initially questioned her, she told him that
Eaton had come to her house the night before, borrowed her car to visit afriend,and after
returning the car, left on foot. R. 368: 65. She said that it was the last time she saw him and
that no one else was present. R. 368: 65.
April 27th Interviews. During the next few weeks, Misty was haunted by the murder
of her friend. As noted above, she imagined seeing him at night, there at the scene and
talking to her. R. 368: 59-60. During that time, she remained close to Jordan, often crying
to him that she "[could not] keep it inside anymore." R. 368: 27-28. Finally, on April 27th,
some three weeks after the murder, she gave police an account of the events that evening in
two separate, but consistent interviews. R. 368: 116-18,129, 138.
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She explained that when Eaton returned her car, he did not leave on foot, but
accompanied her, Jordan, and Terril to Monticello to obtain drugs. R. 368:112. On the way
to Monticello, the friends decided to smoke marijuana, but one of the two brothers asked
Misty to not let them smoke in the car because her mother would be using it the next day.
R. 368: 112. This, she explained, was the first clue she had that they planned to hurt Eaton
in some way. R. 368: 112. However, Misty said she did not know the brothers had brought
guns with them and she denied any knowledge they intended to kill Eaton. R. 368: 114-15,
133, 135.
She said that after turning onto Ucolo Road, she parked and the three men walked into
a grove of trees to smoke a joint of marijuana. R. 368: 113. She remained behind to finish
a cigarette. R. 368: 113. She thereafter heard a single gunshot, followed by a pause, and
then a round of "15 or more" gunshots. R. 368: 113. During the volley of gunshots, she
described hearing Eaton cry and scream, asking, "Why are you guys killing me? What have
I done to you?" R. 368: 113. She then described hearing another solitary shot followed by
quiet. R. 368: 113. She explained that when Jordan and Terril returned to the car, Terril cut
his hand on the barbed wire fence separating the carfromthe grove of trees. R. 368: 114.
When they returned to the car without Eaton, Misty asked if Eaton was still alive. R. 368:
113-14. She told police that Terril responded in the negative, saying he had "shot him in the
head." R. 368: 114. She did not see the brothers carrying any guns. R. 368: 126-27.
Misty told police that after returning to Dove Creek, she and Jordan went to Cortez.
R. 368: 114-15. She explained that when she and Jordan returned to the Calliham home in
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Dove Creek later that night, she saw the two handguns along with Eaton's coat. R. 368:11415. She said that at least one of the brothers cleaned the blood off the guns. R. 368: 115,
130. Finally, Misty explained that she believed defendants killed Eaton because they thought
he had stolen some drugs from them. R. 368: 112.
Preliminary Hearing Testimony. After reaching a plea agreement with the
prosecutor, Misty testified at defendants' preliminary hearing. R. 368: 6-10. In her morning
testimony, Misty gave essentially the same account, but equivocated as to four significant
details. First, she denied any awareness that defendants harbored any ulterior motive when
they insisted on not smoking in the car. R. 368: 35,40,44,47-48. She claimed instead that
the only thing she thought was going to happen was that "[t]hey were going to smoke a
joint." R. 368: 35. Second, she claimed that neither Jordan, nor defendant responded when
she asked if Eaton was dead. R. 368: 24-25. On further inquiry, she recalled telling police
that defendant said he shot Eaton in the head, but she refused "to say Terril said something
or Jordan said something," explaining that she "[did]n't know which one" because she "was
in shock." R. 368: 25. Third, she claimed that she only saw one gun afterwards at the
Calliham house, rather than two. R. 368: 30, 34. Finally, she testified that she knew of no
motive for either brother to kill or hurt Eaton. R. 368: 40-41.
After a short recess midway through her cross-examination by defendant's counsel,
Misty's attorney represented to the court that Misty "only gave partial answers to the
questions, and she'd like an opportunity to clarify what her answers really are to questions
that [the prosecutor] asked." R. 368: 49-50. Misty subsequently acknowledged that when
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Jordan whispered to not let them smoke in her car, she knew "they were going to scare
[Eaton] in some way." R. 368: 50-51. She further explained that she stayed behind when
the three men left to smoke behind the trees because she did not want to be present "if they
were going to beat him up or whatever." R. 368: 50-51. She also reaffirmed that the motive
behind the brothers' actions was that Eaton "had stolen some stufffromJordan." R. 368:7879.
When the court recessed for lunch, Misty reviewed her audio taped interview on the
27th of April. Prelim. 81-82. On re-direct examination, Misty reaffirmed her belief that
when she was told not to let Eaton smoke in the car, the brothers intended to beat up Eaton
for stealing methamphetaminefromJordan. R. 368:83-85. She also reaffirmed that she had
seen both guns at the Calliham residence after the murder. R. 368: 87-89. She again
affirmed that one of the two brothers said that he had "finished [Eaton] in the head," but
indicated she did not know which of the two said it. R. 368: 87, 98. She maintained that
when she told police that it was defendant who made the statement, she also told them that
she was not certain. R. 368: 100.
* * *

Contrary to defendant's claim, Misty's varied accounts of the events surrounding the
murder did not create a substantial doubt about her ability to "distinguish [ ] realityfromher
hallucinations or her dreams or her statements to the police." See Aplt. Brf. at 76. In fact,
except for a few differences, the accounts were consistent. Defendant makes much of the
fact that Misty admitted that part of what she told police was from her so-called
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hallucinations and what she had heard from others. See R. 368: 57 (admitting that some of
what she told police was what she heard in Dove Creek), 59 (admitting that she told police
things that were "just what was in [her] head"), 61 (same). However, when pressed on that
issue, she simply testified that her representation that defendant had said he shot Eaton in the
head was untrue. R. 368: 63. When asked "[w]hat other things [she told] the officers that
weren't true," Misty testified, "That was just my one thing that was bothering me the most."
R. 368: 63.
An examination of her accounts reveals that any differences were nothing more than
an attempt to deceive the court, rather than an inability to distinguish fact from fiction. Her
initial divergence from her account to police appeared to stem in part from her desire to
protect Jordan. See R. 368: 101. It is also explained by an apparent fear of what defendants
might do to her. See R. 368: 89-90. She testified that she "didn't want to say the truth about
what happened" because she "didn't want Jordan to be mad at [her]." R. 368: 89. Misty also
explained that even though she made a deal with the prosecutor, she changed her mind once
she saw defendant and Jordan in the courtroom. R. 368: 89-91. Her expressed fear was
eminently reasonable given the fact her boyfriend had willfully murdered their friend. See
R. 368: 13-14.
Moreover, it was apparent in her initial morning testimony that she was being less
than forthright in her answers. For example, when the prosecutor challenged her testimony
that she simply thought they were going to smoke a joint when they turned onto Ucolo Road,
Misty's responses were less than convincing:
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Prosecutor

Do you remember when you turned off on the Ucolo Road, did
you have a feeling that something was going to happen?

Misty Ernst

Not that. I mean, I don't—I can't say—yeah, something was
going to happen, but not that. They could have—I can't say it
because I—

Prosecutor

You told [Deputy] Kimball that you knew something was going
to happen. Do you remember that?

Misty Ernst

Yeah, I do remember telling him that.

Prosecutor

What were you thinking about when you said that? What did
you think was going to happen?

Misty Ernst

They were going to smoke a joint, and —

Prosecutor

Did you think there was going to be some harm to James?

Misty Ernst

No.

R. 368: 35. Although she eventually stood by her initial testimony, she obviously struggled
getting there.
Likewise, she was never able to fully deny that one of the Calliham brothers told her
he had finished Eaton off in the head. She initially said that neither brother responded to her
question as to whether Eaton was dead. R. 368: 24. When the prosecutor challenged her
testimony, she equivocated:
I can't say I remember that. I mean I remember telling the officer whatever,
but, I mean, that was three weeks before. I mean, I guess—I don't know. I
don't know which one. I mean, I was in shock. I didn't—
R. 368: 25. Thus, she ultimately did not deny that the statement was made, but only hedged
on who made the statement. In fact, she later testified that although she told police that
defendant made the statement, she also told them she was not certain. R. 368: 100.
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Defendant also contends that her testimony at the preliminary hearing was the product
of her review of the audiotape, rather than of her independent memory. Aplt. Brf. at 77 &
n.54. However, she did not review the audiotape until the lunch recess. See R. 368: 81-82.
When testimony resumed, Misty added only two facts of any arguable significance that she
included in her police interviews, but failed to mention earlier in the preliminary hearing.
First, she added that she heard a solitary gunshot following the volley of shots, R. 368: 86,
but that detail merely corroborated her prior testimony that one of the brothers said he
finished Eaton off in the head. Second, she added that Jordan showed her the second gun.
R. 368: 87-89. Other than those two details, her testimony after reviewing the audiotape was
not materially different.
(c) Corroboration
Significantly, Misty's account of the events surrounding the murder was strongly
corroborated by other evidence discovered by police. Police recovered 219 mm shell casings
at the scene, R. 368: 123,138,146-47, corroborating Misty's account that she heard "15 or
more" gunshots, R. 368:113. The State Crime Lab verified that two weapons were used, R.
368: 139, verifying both brothers' participation, R. 368: 113-15. The Crime Lab also
identified one of the guns as a Smith & Wesson Sigma, which was the same kind of gun
stolen in a St. George robbery to which defendant admitted. R. 368: 139-40. Eaton's body
was found in a grove of trees near a barbed wire fence, R. 368: 138, 146, just as Misty
described, R. 368: 112-13. Eaton was also found without a coat, corroborating information
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that he had been seen with it earlier and Misty's account that defendant had taken it from
him. R. 368: 28, 114-15, 138, 147.
Finally, police confirmed that Misty and Jordan visited Michael Gentry late that
evening. R. 368: 141-43. Gentry told police that Jordan discussed a problem he had with
someone in Dove Creek who owed him money for drugs. R. 368:141-43. Gentry told police
that Jordan said he had taken care of the problem, while mimicking with his hand the act of
pulling the trigger on a gun. R. 368: 141-43. Gentry also told police that Jordan had
instructed him to be sure to tell police they were there at his house that night. R. 368: 143.
All of these additional facts, withheld from the public, see R. 375: 16-18,21-22, 9596,102-03, spoke to the reliability of Misty's account and her ability to accurately remember
and relate the events of that night. Moreover, the defense had every opportunity to attack
Misty's credibility and they took advantage of that opportunity. They exploited the
discrepancies in Misty's accounts of the murder. R. 376: 52-53, 57-58, 60. They also
introduced testimony that Misty had a reputation in the community for being dishonest. R.
375: 143, 150, 158-59, 164, 200-01. A psychological examination would have offered no
more.
C.

DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT.

Defendant also contends that his right to confront witnesses under the federal and state
constitutions was violated because he was not permitted "to fully explore and explain the
unique functioning of Misty's mental processes." Aplt. Brf. at 80-81 & n.57. He further
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argues that because the alleged error resulted in the violation of his constitutionalrights,the
State must establish the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Brf. at 81 -82.
Because defendant did not raise these constitutional claims below, this Court should not
address them now on appeal.
The law is well-settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). This
"preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."
Id {citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d
1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). Defendant has argued neither plain error, nor exceptional
circumstances. Accordingly, this Court will not address defendant's constitutional claims
for thefirsttime on appeal. See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,
1129 n.5 (Utah 1995).
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III.
ADMISSION OF JORDAN'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS,
REDACTED TO OMIT ANY REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT, DID
NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
A.

DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIALS.

Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in admitting the redacted admissions
of his brother Jordan, rather than severing the brothers' trials. Aplt. Brf. at 82-95. Because
defendant abandoned his motion for severance, he waived that claim on appeal.
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to sever his trialfromthat of his brother Jordan
on the ground the prosecution intended to introduce certain out-of-court statements made by
Jordan "injurious to [defendant's] defense" and which allegedly could not be "cured by
redaction." R. 133.12 Although the motion represented that a supporting memorandum
would be forthcoming, none was filed and no ruling from the court appears on the record.
See R. 133. A review of the record reveals that no ruling was issued because defendant did
not pursue his severance motion, but instead agreed to the admission of Jordan's statements,
redacted to omit all reference to defendant.
The disposition of defendant's motion for severance was disclosed in the course of
a ruling at trial on a motion for mistrial made by defendant's counsel. In denying the mistrial
motion, the trial court observed:

12

A previous motion to sever was also filed, alleging that the brothers' defenses
were irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. R. 34-39. Finding that defendant did not
show that their defenses were mutually exclusive, the trial court denied the motion. R.
49-50. Defendant has not appealed that ruling.
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The resolution we reached this morning, before we started the trial, is that the
witnesses who had listened to those admissions by Jordan Calliham would say
instead of we, they would say "I". And that was a resolution acceptable to
[defendant's counsel], proposed by [the prosecutor], to which [Jordan's
counsel] raised some objection
R. 374: 116 (emphasis added). Defendant's counsel confirmed that agreement as he
discussed its scope:
Defense
Counsel

Your Honor, if I can just correct what my understanding of our
discussion in chambers was, we didn't exclude Misty from those
people—

Court

We never even discussed her.

Defense
Counsel

We just talked about people who would testify about certain
statements implicating Jordan—Terril Calliham.

R. 374: 118. Therefore, defendant agreed to the admission of Jordan's out-of-court
statements in a redacted form that omitted any reference to defendant.
Because defendant did not pursue his severance motion, agreeing instead to the
admission of Jordan's redacted out-of-court statements, he affirmatively waived any right to
challenge on appeal the propriety of his joint trial with Jordan. See State v. Johnson, 856
P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that "[a] defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's
ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate court"). This Court should
not, therefore, address that claim on appeal.
The Court also will not address an unpreserved issue on appeal if a strategic reason
existed for counsel's failure to pursue the claim at trial. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,
343 (Utah 1997). As observed by the trial court, admission of the redacted statements
appears to have benefitted defendant because they provided a contrast in the strength of the
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evidence against each brother and even implied that only Jordan and Misty were present
when Eaton was murdered. See R. 376:13-14. Although counsel was not permitted to argue
that implication to the jury, see R. 376: 13, the inference is apparent. It is reasonable to
assume that counsel agreed to the admission of the redacted statements for those reasons.
Having thus made a conscious, reasonable decision not to pursue his motion for severance,
he cannot now claim error on appeal.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.

Defendant also challenges, on the same ground, the trial court's denial of his motions
for a mistrial. See Aplt. Brf. at 85-865 89. As explained above, however, defendant agreed
to the admission of Jordan's redacted statements and therefore waived any challenge to them.
In any event, the redacted statements comported with established Supreme Court precedent
and any incidental testimony by Misty worked no prejudice to defendant.
1. Procedural Background.
On direct examination, Misty Ernst testified that when Jordan returned to the car after
speaking with Michael Gentry, he told her that he had told Gentry "what him and Terril had
done." R. 374: 50. Because Jordan's statement was not redacted to refer only to Jordan,
defendant moved for a mistrial. R. 374:113-14. The trial court denied the motion, finding
that its order requiring redaction of Jordan's statements did not contemplate statements made
to Misty. R. 374: 116. The court further found that Misty's testimony was not prejudicial
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to defendant because the case rested on the credibility of her testimony anyway. R. 374:11617.
At the close of all the evidence, the trial court asked defendant if he wished to move
for a mistrial based on the admission of Jordan's redacted out-of-court statements. R. 375:
213-15. After consulting with his attorney, defendant decided not to move for a mistrial. R.
375: 213-15. However, the following day, just prior to the court's reading of the jury
instructions, defendant reversed his decision from the day before and moved for a mistrial.
R. 376:9-11. Defendant contended that a mistrial was warranted not only because of Misty's
unredacted testimony, but also because of the admission of Jordan's redacted statements to
his cellmates. R. 376: 10. Defendant reasoned that these statements created a "spillover
prejudicial effect" because the jury would "assume that if Jordan Calliham was involved in
this and is admitting to it, then it's only natural that Misty's entire statement is true and that
Terril Calliham was involved, too." R. 376: 10. The trial court denied defendant's mistrial
motion, holding that admission of the redacted statements may have actually worked to
defendant's benefit and did not otherwise prejudice him. R. 376: 13-14.
2. Standard of Appellate Review.
The overriding issue before a trial court on a motion for a mistrial is whether "'the
conduct complained of prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f
20, 999 P.2d 7 {quoting State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 19, 975 P.2d 469)). The
decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not,
therefore, be disturbed "'absent an abuse of that discretion.'" Id (quoting Kiriluk, 1999 UT
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App 30, at f 19). "Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to
have had a fair trial, [the Court] will not find that the [trial] court's decision was an abuse of
discretion." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997); accord Kohl, 2000 UT
35, at \ 20; State v. Telford, 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that the trial
court's refusal to sever a trial requires reversal "only if a more favorable result for defendant
would have been reasonably likely had the trial court severed the trial"). Whether testimony
is admitted in violation of a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, % 12,999 P.2d 565
(reviewing for correctness whether the judge should have returned the jury for further
deliberation or declared a mistrial when juror equivocated during jury polling); State v.
Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419, 423 (N.M. 1999) (holding that whether admission of hearsay
evidence violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law).
Where a mistrial motion rests on a violation of defendant's constitutional rights to confront
the witnesses, the Court will reverse the conviction for any such error unless it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,253-54, 89 S.Ct. 1726,
1728(1969).
3. The Court Properly Admitted Jordan's Out-of-Court Statements to
Cellmates.
As explained above, because defendant agreed to the admission of the redacted
statements, he waived any claim they were improperly admitted. Therefore, just as defendant
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cannot rely on the admission of those statements as a basis for reversal of the trial court's
ruling on the abandoned motion for severance, he cannot rely on their admission as a basis
for reversal of the ruling on the mistrial motion.
(a) Admission of Accomplice Confessions and the Bruton Exception.
Even had defendant preserved his claim, the admission of Jordan's redacted
statements to cellmates did not violate his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused
the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const, amend. VI.
Obviously, the right to confront one's accusers includes the right to cross-examine them.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,404,85 S.Ct. 1065,1068 (1965). Therefore, the prosecution
may not introduce a hearsay statement against the accused unless the declarant is unavailable.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980). Even then, the hearsay
declaration will be admitted against the defendant only if it "falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception" or if it otherwise carries "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. While a defendant's own admissions "carry a distinguished heritage confirming their
admissibility" under the Confrontation Clause, "an accomplice's [hearsay] statements that
shift or spread the blame to [the] defendant" generally do not. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116, 127, 133-34, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1895, 1898-99 (1999).
A defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is of particular concern
when he is jointly tried with an accomplice whose confession, implicating both the
accomplice and the defendant, is introduced against the accomplice. While the accomplice's
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statement is admissible against him, it is not admissible against his co-defendant.
"Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be
a witness 'against5 a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against
a co-defendant." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707 (1987);
accord State v. Nield, 804 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah App. 1990). However, in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), the Supreme Court carved out a "narrow
exception" to that general principle. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 707. The
high court concluded that in a joint trial, too great ariskexists that jurors will consider the
accomplice's statement against the defendant even when clearly instructed to disregard it.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-37,88 S.Ct at 1627-28. The Court thus held that the Confrontation
Clause prohibited the admission of accomplice confessions inculpating the defendant. Id.
at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628.
The Bruton exception was reconsidered by the Supreme Court almost twenty years
later in Richardson. In that case, the high court observed that whereas the accomplice
confession admitted in Bruton '"expressly implicated]' the defendant as his accomplice,"
the confession admitted in Richardson was redacted to omit all reference to the defendant.
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203,208,107 S.Ct. at 1705,1707 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124
n. 1,88 S.Ct. at 1621 n. 1) (brackets in original). The Court found significant that the redacted
confession in Richardson "was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked
with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant's own testimony)." Id. at 208,107 S.Ct.
at 1707. The Court concluded that "[wjhere the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is
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a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the
evidence." Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1708. Thus, "Richardson placed outside the scope of
Bruton 's rule those statements that incriminate inferentially." Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S.
185, 195, 118 S.Ct. at 1151, 1156(1998).
Richardson's rationale in rejecting a rule that would require the prosecution to sever
the trials of co-defendants if it wished to use their confessions in court is worth repeating.
[Such a rule] is not as facile or as just a remedy as might seem. Joint trials
play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for almost one-third
of federal criminal trials in the past five years.... Joint trials generally serve
the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more
accurate assessment of relative culpability-advantages which sometimes
operate to the defendant's benefit. Even apart from these tactical
considerations, joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding
the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts. The other way of assuring
compliance with an expansive Bruton rule would be to forgo use of
codefendant confessions. That price also is too high, since confessions "are
more than merely * desirable'; they are essential to society's compelling interest
in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic
one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the
belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests
of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process.
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209-211, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Court thus held "that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his
or her existence." Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709.
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(b) Analysis.
The court's admission of Jordan's redacted statements safely navigated outside
Bruton 's exception, falling safely within the general rule that trials courts may assume the
jury will follow limiting instructions not to consider an accomplice's confession against the
defendant. The jury was clearly instructed that Jordan's out-of-court statements to the
cellmates could be considered against him, but not against defendant. See R. 343.l3
Defendant does not contend otherwise. Moreover, Jordan's admissions to the three cellmates
were redacted to exclude all reference to defendant. R. 374:180-97. Contrary to defendant's
claim, those redactions did not distort Jordan's statements—they simply omitted those
portions which also inculpated defendant. See Aplt. Brf. at 93.
In December 1999, Deputy Grayson Redd of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office
took statements from three of Jordan's cellmates at the San Juan County Jail—Michael
Mulvey, Richard Raso, and Adrian Killsinsight. See R. 374: 180-97.; R. 387-91.14 A
comparison of the cellmates' interviews with their testimony at trial readily confirms that the
redactions at trial complied with Richardson without distorting the substance of the
confessions.15
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Instruction No. 14 and Instruction No. 15 are reproduced in Addendum D.
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The police reports summarizing the cellmates' interviews with Deputy Redd,
made part of the record on appeal, are reproduced in Addendum E.
15

The transcript of the cellmates' testimony is reproduced in Addendum F.
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Michael Mulvey. In a telephone interview, Michael Mulvey told Deputy Redd that
while he was in jail, Jordan told him: (1) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend took the victim
to a' country road;'" (2) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend were present when the victim was
killed;" and (3) he wanted to take the rap so his brother could get off." R. 389 (emphasis
added). At trial, Mulvey confirmed that Jordan had told him: (1) "he and his girlfriend took
a victim to a country road;" and (2) "he and his girlfriend were present when the victim was
killed." R. 374: 181 (emphasis added). The omission of all references to defendant did not
distort the statement, but simply ensured that defendant was not also implicated.
Richard Raso. Richard Raso, who had shared a cell with Jordan for two months,
reported to Deputy Redd that Jordan told him: (1) "the killing was over money owed him for
a l/4# marijuana," (2) "he, his brother, and his girlfriend took the victim on a road between
Monticello and the Colorado state line and shot him 19 times," (3) "he and his brother took
the victim while the girl stayed at the vehicle," (4) "the victim was his bestfriendbut that he
got what he deserved," (5) "one of the guns was a Smith and Wesson 9 mm Sigma," (6)
"How can they find the gun when it was burned up," and (7) "after the shooting him and his
brother split up and went in different directions." R. 390 (emphasis added). Raso also told
Deputy Redd that Jordan explained how he had fired the gun, where he had shot the victim,
and how the victim had 'Vibrated" while being shot. R. 390-91. In doing so, Raso mimicked
the way Jordan had demonstrated these actions. R. 390-91.
At trial, Raso confirmed Jordan told him that (1) "he, his girlfriend took the victim
on a road between Monticello and the Colorado state line, shot him 19 times," (2) "while that
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was occurring his girlfriend had stayed at the vehicle," (3) "the victim was his best friend,
but that he got what he deserved," and (4) "How can they find the gun when it was burned
up?" See R. 374:186-87 (emphasis added). Raso's testimony, therefore, as redacted to omit
any reference to defendant, complied with Richardson 's mandate and in no way distorted the
substance of his statement—it simply did not inculpate defendant as well.
The prosecutor also asked Raso whether Jordan told him that he and his girlfriend had
gone to Cortez after the shooting. R. 374: 187. Raso testified that "[h]e never said that,"
explaining that Jordan said that "they had split up." R. 374: 187. Although Raso had
presumably reported to Deputy Redd that "him and his brother split up" after the shooting,
R. 390, the clear import of Raso's testimony was that Jordan had said he and his girlfriend
had split up after the shooting. Accordingly, no reference was made to defendant.16
Even if Raso's testimony could be construed as indirectly referring to defendant, it
would not violate Bruton. As recently held by Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "where a
defendant's name is replaced with a neutral pronoun or phrase there is no Bruton violation,
providing that the incrimination of the defendant is only by reference to evidence other than
the redacted statement and a limiting instruction is given to the jury." United States v.
16

The prosecutor also explored Jordan's other statements to Raso, but those
statements did not implicate defendant. SeeR. 374: 186-90. For example, Raso
confirmed that Jordan had told him where the bullets were fired into Eaton's body and
how his body moved "in a vibrating motion" when the bullets hit him. R. 374: 188-90.
Raso showed the jury how Jordan had demonstrated these actions. R. 374: 188-89. On
the other hand, Raso clarified some apparent inaccuracies in the police report. He
testified that Jordan had only told him that he was accused of shooting Eaton over a
marijuana debt, using a Smith & Wesson 9 mm Sigma, and firing the gun in a particular
manner. R. 374: 186-88.
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Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208,1214 (10th Cir. 1999). This is so because "'referring to
joint activity by use of the pronouns "we" and "they," or by use of indefinite words such as
"someone," does not draw attention to the redaction and thus, in most situations, will not be
incriminating unless linked to a codefendant by other trial evidence.'" Id. (quoting United
States v.Edwards, 159F.3d 1117,1126 (8th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 825,120S.Q.
310 (1999)). There is no Bruton violation if, as here, reference to "they" implicates
defendant only after consideration of additional evidence outside the statement itself. Id. at
1214-15.
Adrian Killsinsight Adrian Killsinsight reported to Deputy Redd that Jordan had told
him: (1) "he had killed the victim;" (2) "they went into the woods and shot him up;" (3) "he
shot [the victim] 10 times;"(4) "he 'capped him because his [sic] owed him $300 for coke;'"
and (5) "they 'tortured him' [and] [tjhey 'shot him up." R. 387-88 (emphasis added).
Killsinsight also indicated to Deputy Redd that Jordan demonstrated to him with his hand
how he fired the gun as they shot Eaton. R. 387. At trial, Killsinsight confirmed that Jordan
told him: (1) "he had killed the victim;" (2) "he had went into the woods and shot him up;"
(3) "he capped him because he owed him $300 for coke;" and (4) "he had tortured him, [and]
that he had shot him up." R. 374: 193-95. He also demonstrated for the jury the hand
gestures made by Jordan when he explained to him how he shot Eaton. R. 374:194. As with
the other cellmates, Killsinsight did not reference defendant at all, nor did it distort the
substance of Jordan's statement.
* * *
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In sum, Jordan's redacted statements omitted all reference to defendant and thus
complied with Richardson. Contrary to defendant's claim, they did not directly implicate
defendant in the murder. Aplt. Brf. at 95. Counsel at trial recognized this fact, only
complaining that the jury would "assume that if Jordan Calliham was involved in this and is
admitting to it, then it's only natural that Misty's entire statement is true and that Terril
Calliham was involved, too." R. 376: 10. In other words, the statements were only
incriminating against defendant when "linked" with Misty's testimony. Richardson, 481
U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707. Because Jordan's redacted statements to his cellmates
"w[ere] not incriminating on [their] face, and became so only when linked with [other]
evidence," the trial court below "could properly assume" that the jury, as instructed, did not
use Jordan's admissions against defendant. Id. & n.3.
4. Admission of Jordan's Unredacted Statement to Misty Ernst Did Not
Prejudice Defendant
Defendant further contends that the admission of Jordan's unredacted statement to
Misty Ernst while they were in Cortez also violated his confrontration rights under Bruton.
Aplt. Brf. at 85-86,94-95. That testimony was the basis for defendant's motion for mistrial
during the prosecutor's direct examination of Misty. Specifically, defendant challenges the
following highlighted testimony:
Prosecutor

. . . [W]hat happened, after you finished at Michael J's?

Misty Ernst

I asked Jordan what he told Michael J and he told MichaelJ
what him and Terril had done.

Prosecutor

Is that what he told you?
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Mistv Ernst

Um-hm. He said that he hurt this guy-

R. 374:50 (emphasis added). Because Misty retreatedfromher original statement, indicating
instead that Jordan "said that he hurt this guy," defendant was not implicated and no Bruton
violation occurred. Reversal is not warranted in any event because any arguable error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because a Bruton violation implicates a defendant's constitutional right to confront
the witnesses, the State must show that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Harrington, 395 U.S. at 253-54, 89 S.Ct. at 1728. Whether an error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt "depends upon a host of factors," including:
the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of
cross- examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of
the prosecution's case.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431,1438 (1986); accord State v.
VillareaU 889 P.2d419,425-26 (Utah 1995). Consideration of those factors here reveals that
any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The relative importance of Misty's testimony that Jordan said he had told Gentry
"what him and Terril had done" is determinative. The statement to Misty carried almost no
importance, if any at all. The remark had meaning only in the context of Misty's other
admissible testimony, in which she testified that both defendant and Jordan went into a grove
of trees with Eaton and shot him. Thus, the jury could only determine what "Terril had done"
based on Misty's other testimony. Moreover, as noted above, when the prosecutor asked
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Misty to reaffirm that Jordan made such a statement, she retreated, indicating instead that
Jordan "said that he hurt this guy." R. 374: 50.
The other factors also demonstrate that any alleged error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Misty testified that defendant himself told her "that he had shot [Eaton]
and he wasn't falling over," and he therefore "thought he was gonna have to kick him over."
R. 374: 59. Accordingly, the statement was cumulative. Moreover, the statement in no way
corroborated Misty's other testimony as would confessions to others, an important concern
underlying the Bruton rule. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 203-04,107 S.Ct. at 1705. Finally,
as discussed supra, at 53, Misty's other testimony was corroborated by other evidence
gathered by police, including the twenty-one 9 mm shell casings from two different guns
found at the crime scene, the location of Eaton's body in a grove of trees adjacent to a barbed
wire fence, Michael Gentry's statement, and Eaton's missing coat. The medical examiner's
finding that at least nineteen bullets penetrated Eaton's body, including a single shot to the
face fired at close range, also corroborated Misty's testimony. See R. 375: 75-80, 84.
Because any alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court properly
declined to grant a mistrial.17

l7

In a footnote, defendant argues that the Court should "reject the redaction method
of dealing with Bruton issues" under his right to confrontation under article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution. Aplt. Brf. at 94 n. 66. Because he presents no separate argument
or meaningful analysis under the state constitutional provision, this Court should not
address his state constitutional claim. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 873 n. 6 (Utah 1993).
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN READING
PORTIONS OF MISTY ERNST'S TESTIMONY AT THE JURY'S
REQUEST
A.

JURY REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT.

During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting the "testimony
transcripts." R. 376: 83.l8 During a brief discussion outside the presence of the jury, the
court clarified that the jury was seeking only a particular portion of the testimony. R. 376:
84. Counsel for both defendants objected to providing the transcripts, which were not then
available. R. 376:85. Defendant's attorney also objected to allowing the jury to view the
video tape of the proceedings, maintaining that they should "rely on their memory and their
notes." R. 376: 85. When the jury reconvened, the court told the jury that no transcripts
were available and explained its reservations in allowing the jury to view the video tape of
the proceedings. R. 376: 89-90. The court indicated that it would attempt to "find some
reason to provide [the transcripts] if and only if [the jury] simply cannot reach a verdict
without [them]." R. 376: 90. However, the court "encourage[d] [them] to try to reach a
verdict as hard as [they] can without having been provided that additional information." R.
376: 90.
The court recessed near midnight, some twelve hours into deliberations, after the jury
informed the court that although it had reached a verdict as to one of the defendants, it was

The jury also requested a calendar that shows the phases of the moon during that
time period and the weather conditions between April 3rd and April 9th. R. 376: 83.
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still unable to reach a verdict as to the other. R. 376: 93-95, R. 377: 4. When the jury
returned for deliberations the next morning, it delivered another note to the judge which read:
| Testimony on one answer on Misty cross examine.
j
I First question by defense: "Why did you change your \
\ answer."
I
R. 377:4. The court then notified the parties of its intentions to first, have the jury announce
its verdict as to the defendant for whom they had reached a verdict, and second, to re-read
the testimony which the jury sought to review. R. 377: 4-5. The court asked whether
"anyone want[ed] to note any objections." R. 377: 5. Counsel for both defendants said they
had none. R. 377: 5.
After the jury announced Jordan's guilty verdict, the court queried the jury as to what
portion of the testimony it wished to review. R. 377: 6-10. The court determined that the
jury wished to review Misty's response to the prosecutor's question on re-direct as to why
she "testified] at the preliminary hearing that defendant fired the last shot and testified] now
that Jordan shot the last shot?" R. 377: 7-10.
After additional review of the video tape, the court read two excerpts of Misty's
testimony. The court read the following from Misty's cross-examination by defendant's
attorney:
Defense
Counsel

And you also told him in this particular statement, um, you
were not sure who said, "I shot him in the head," but you
thought it was Terril.

Misty Ernst

Yes.
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Defense
Counsel

Okay. And the reason you said that was to protect Jordan?

Mistv Ernst

Yes.

R. 374:81; R. 377:15. The court also read the following from the prosecutor's re-direct
examination of Misty:
Prosecutor

Do you recall at one point in that preliminary hearing when
your attorney stood up and indicated that you hadn't been
fully truthful with me?

Mistv Ernst

Yes.

Prosecutor

And what occurred after that?

Misty Ernst

I started telling the truth

Prosecutor

And what was the purpose for you being less than forthright
in the morning testimony that you gave?

Mistv Ernst

Because I thought if I didn't tell the truth, that they couldn't
find Jordan guilty of it.

R. 374:104-05; R.377:15-16. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues this was
reversible error. Aplt. Brf. at 96-100.
B.

DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO A RE-READING OF THE TESTIMONY.

"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be made in order to preserve
an issue for appeal." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989) {citing Utah R.
Evid. 103(a)); accord Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at % 11. Although defendant objected to giving
the jury a transcript or video tape of the testimony in response to the jury's first note, he did
not object the next morning to a re-reading of the relevant testimony in response to the jury's
second note. When asked if there were any objections, defense counsel responded, "No."
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R. 377: 5. Having made a conscious decision to abandon his former objection, defendant
cannot now claim error on appeal, even under a plain error analysis. See State v. Medina,
738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (refusing to apply plain error analysis to defendant's
unpreserved claim where counsel "consciously chose not to assert any objection" and so
indicated to court). In any event, defendant has not argued the applicability of either the
plain error or exceptional circumstances exceptions. Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022 (refusing to
address an unpreserved claim on appeal where defendant has not argued plain error or
exceptional circumstances).
C.

RE-READING THE TESTIMONY WAS WITHIN THE JUDGE'S DISCRETION.

In any event, defendant has not shown any error, much less plain error. To show plain
error, defendant must show in thefirstinstance the existence of an error. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). He must then show that the error is both "obvious and
harmful." Whittle, 780 P.2d at 821; accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant has not met
that burden.
1. Rule 17 Does Not Preclude the Re-reading of Testimony.
Relying on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alerius, defendant contends a trial
court is without authority to re-read portions of witness testimony because rule 17, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not expressly authorize a trial court to do so. Aplt. Brf.
at 98. That claim ignores this Court's pronouncement long ago that "it is within the trial
court's discretion to grant the jury's request to re-read parts of the testimony." State v. Hines,
6 Utah 2d 126, 129, 307 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1957).
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Moreover, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alerius, which literally means "the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another," does not apply here. Field v. Boyer Co.,
L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998). "[T]his principle is only an aid to statutory
interpretation; it is not a rule of law, and it has only limited application." Cullum v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993). The principle "appropriately applies only
where in the natural association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject which is
expressed and one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not
intended to be included." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1025 (internal quotes and footnotes omitted).
No such inference can be made here.
Rule 17(m) discusses the procedure by which a jury may obtain further clarification
of the law. See Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m). Articulating that procedure does not support an
inference that the trial court is without power to re-read portions of testimony. Nor does
subsection (k), which identifies tangible things which a jury "may take with them" into
deliberations, support such an inference. Utah R. Crim. P. 17(k). Defendant nevertheless
argues that rule 17fs plain import is that a jury should only rely on their own recollections of
the evidence in rendering a verdict. Aplt. Brf. at 98. However, even after a re-reading of
testimony, juror's still must rely on their own recollection of that testimony when they return
to deliberate.
In sum, rule 17 does not purport to restrict the court's authority to re-read portions of
the transcript upon a request by the jury. Rather, that authority lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Hines, 6 Utah 2d at 129, 307 P.2d at 889.
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2. The Portion of Testimony Read Was Sufficient
When exercising its discretion to re-read testimony, the court must "observe caution
that evidence is not so selected, nor used in such a manner, that there is a likelihood of it
being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury which would confer an unfair advantage
on either party." Id. Defendant now argues for thefirsttime on appeal that the court abused
its discretion because it "focus[ed] on Ernst's inconsistencies about whofiredthe last shot,
rather than about Ernst's inconsistencies regarding who fired the first shot, the area of
concern to the jury." Aplt. Brf. at 99. This claim is without merit.
After the jury rendered its verdict for Jordan, the trial court sought to clarify what
testimony the jury wanted to review:
Juror

She said that at first Terril was thefirst:one to shoot, but then
she changed it to Jordan. And she was protecting Jordan first
and then she changed it.

Court

Okay. That—that—that statement was as to who shot the last
shot. Who shot the last shot. Not as to who shot thefirstshot.
It was—

Juror

When she was trying to protect Jordan.

Court

Okay. I know—I—I thought that's what you were talking
about and that subject is covered in actually not in cross
examine, but it's covered in the re-direct examination by [the
prosecutor]. "Why did you testify at the preliminary hearing
that Terril fired the last shot and testifying now that Jordan
shot the last shot?" That's the question. Is that the issue that
you're wanting to cover?

Juror

[No audible response]

R. 377: 9-10. The foregoing exchange makes clear that although the juror initially referred
to the first shot, that reference was mistaken. This only makes sense because Misty never
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testified, either at the preliminary hearing or at trial, as to who fired the first shot. The jury's
concern, therefore, could only have been in reference to the identity of the person who fired
the last shot. Moreover, no audible response from the jury was recorded to the judge's
question as to whether that was in fact their concern; yet, the court proceeded as if the jury
affirmed his understanding. R. 377:10. Accordingly, the only reasonable conclusion is that
the jury affirmed the court's understanding that the issue was as the court articulated.
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in failing to include the following
additional testimony:
Prosecutor

And what happened to make you change your testimony in the
afternoon? Did you have a talk with me? Is that part of it?

Misty Ernst

Yeah.

Prosecutor

Did you have a talk with your attorney?

Misty Ernst

Yes.

Prosecutor

Prior to that time, you had agreed that you would testify
truthfully and for that you would get some consideration on
your charge.

Misty Ernst

Yes.

Prosecutor

And you were told you were in jeopardy of that.

Misty Ernst

Yes.

Prosecutor

So you came back in the afternoon and what did you do?

Misty Ernst

Told the whole truth.

R. 374: 105. If defendant had requested it, the court may very well have included the
additional testimony. However, it was not necessary to respond to the jury's inquiry. As
noted, the jury wanted to review Misty's testimony that "she was trying to protect Jordan."
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R. 377: 10. The testimony that was re-read explained why she initially claimed that
defendant fired the last shot—the question of interest to the jury. The additional testimony
explained why she was now testifying that Jordan fired the last shot—to keep her plea
agreement to testify truthfully.
D.

ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

In any event, any error in re-reading the testimony was harmless. See Dunn, 850 P.2d
at 1208. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the re-read testimony, which only tended to
exculpate defendant, harmed him. Rather than testifying that defendant admitted to firing
the last shot, Misty testified that Jordan admitted to doing so. Counsel for defendant used
that point to his advantage in closing:
She comes to the preliminary hearing in a courtroom right here, this
courtroom. She's placed under oath and she admitted to you Tuesday that she
lied under oath at the preliminary hearing. Why did she say she was lying?
Not to protect herself, she says, but to protect Jordan. And what does she
consistently lie about when we compare it with her trial testimony? She
consistently lied about Terril being the person who shot James Eaton in the
head. But when she came to court, then her testimony changed. Then it
was—then it was Jordan who said it.
R. 376: 53. Counsel then reminded the jury that evidence was introduced indicating Misty
did not have a reputation for honesty. R. 376: 53. He pointed out that her account was "in
what Jordan told her," and that "Terril didn't tell her anything." R. 376: 54. He further
explained:
She turns around after her questioning. After her arrest, she enters into a
plea agreement—a plea bargain with the prosecutor where, according to her
testimony, how much punishment she receives is going to depend on how her
testimony—how she testifies, how well she testifies. But the important thing
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about that is she doesn't—she doesn't even remember what crime she pled
guilty to.
I think the evidence shows that Misty Ernst was at the homicide scene on
Ucolo Road on the 3rd of April and I think from the evidence you can clearly
infer that she participated in the killing of James Eaton. The question you
must answer, with regard to the case versus my client Terril Calliham, is are
you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot James Eaton?
R. 376: 54. The jury, therefore, was well aware of Misty's plea bargain. The re-read
testimony also reinforced the defense's claim that Misty could not be believed. And while
it offered a legitimate explanation for Misty's change in testimony, it did nothing to further
incriminate defendant. Indeed, the Court may safely assume that counsel consciously chose
not to insist on any further reading because he wanted the jury to give credence to that
explanation. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59 (holding that a party cannot rely on plain error if
"counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court
into error").
V.
THE PROSECUTOR'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT REGARDING
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT AND DOES NOT OTHERWISE WARRANT REVERSAL
OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION
In his last claim on appeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor incorrectly
explained accomplice liability in his rebuttal argument. Aplt. Brf. at 100-05. Defendant did
not, however, object to the prosecutor's argument at trial. See R. 376:69. The failure to
object to the prosecutor's remarks constitutes a waiver of the claim unless defendant can
establish plain error. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781,785 (Utah 1992). As discussed in point
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IV above, to show plain error, defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant]."
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant has not met that burden.
A prosecutor's comments in closing argument will constitute prosecutorial misconduct
if they call to the jurors' attention matters which they could not properly consider in reaching
a verdict. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 42, | 39, 994 P.2d 177.
However, even improper remarks will not warrant reversal unless defendant establishes "that
the prosecutor's remarks were obviously improper and harmful." Colwell, 2000 UT 42, at
f 39. Utah's accomplice liability statute reads in relevant part as follows:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999). A review of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, in light
of the accomplice liability statute, reveals no error.
The prosecutor explained accomplice liability as follows:
Now, you've heard some testimonyfromour expert andfromtheir expert
that basically says, "You know what? This may have occurred in this way.
There may have been one gun—"excuse me"—"there may have been two guns
and one shooter." Well there's the instruction in here, No. 6, that talks about
accomplice liability. Ladies and gentleman, if you drive down to First Security
Bank here and somebody walks in with a mask on and holds that bank up and
you're sittin' out in the car in a get away car, you're guilty of bank robbery.
If you participate in that, it doesn't matter that you're the one in the bank that
hands them the note.
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I'm not asking you to believe that there was only one shooter here and there
was two guns and one shooter, but what I'm saying is even if you believe it,
Instruction No. 6 says, "One who does not actually commit a crime, but who
aids, solicits, encourages or commands another in the commission of a crime
may be convicted of a crime as an accomplice." Well if that person intends
that it be committed. Aids, solicits, encourages, commands. Terril Calliham
was standing right there. You can still find Terril Calliham guilty under that
right there ifhe helped in this in any way if he provided a gun, if he helped him
get away, if he tried to help him with an alibi.
R. 376: 69 (emphasis added).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's argument constituted misconduct because
"one's mere presence at a scene of a crime does not give rise to probable cause, let alone
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Brf. at 103. The prosecutor, however, never
implied that presence alone was sufficient. He recited the accomplice liability statute, and
reiterated, "Aids, solicits, encourages, commands." R. 376: 69. He further stated that
defendant could be convicted "if he helped" in the murder. R. 376: 69. Nothing in his
argument suggested that defendant could be convicted as an accomplice for simply being
present.
Defendant further argues that even if he provided a gun to Jordan, he could not be
convicted as an accomplice if he did not have the requisite intent. Aplt. Brf. at 103. Again,
the prosecutor did not argue otherwise. To the contrary, the prosecutor expressly pointed out
that a person could be convicted as an accomplice "if that person intends that it be
committed." R. 376: 69.
Finally, defendant claims that it was error to argue he could be found guilty as an
accomplice if he helped Jordan escape or create an alibi. Aplt. Brf. at 103. A person who
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intentionally assists someone in the commission of an offense by providing the means of
escape is without question an accomplice. See State v. Murphy, 26 Utah 2d 330,489 P.2d
430 (Utah 1971) (acknowledging that a person who intentionally participates in a robbery by
providing transportation to and from the robbery is guilty as a principal). It follows that
defendant could also be convicted as a principal if he helped Jordan avoid apprehension by
establishing an alibi. Defendant argues that helping Jordan escape or create an alibi would
more likely constitute obstruction ofjustice under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999). Aplt.
Brf. at 103. However, the difference between a conviction as an accomplice for the principal
crime and a conviction for obstructing justice under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (1999) lies
in the mens rea element of the crimes. Under the obstructing justice statute, the State must
show defendant acted with the "intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery,
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8306. On the other hand, the accomplice liability statute requires proof that the defendant
"act[ed] with the mental state required for the commission of [the principal] offense." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Thus, where a defendant intended to help another commit a murder
by assisting him in creating an alibi, he is arguably guilty of that murder as an accomplice.
Even if the prosecutor misstated the law, the error was neither obvious nor prejudicial.
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, . To show harm, defendant must establish that "under the
circumstances of the [ ] case, there was a probability that the jurors were influenced by the
prosecutor's remarks." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). The prosecutor's
remarks here were but a brief alternative argument, subordinate to the State's primary
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contention that defendant actually participated in the shooting of the victim. "That defense
counsel at trial did not object to this portion of the closing argument is a sign that what was
said sounded less exciting at trial than appellate counsel now would have it seem."
Commonwealth v. Deveau, 606 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Mass. App. 1993). Moreover, the court
instructed the jury that "[s]tatements of the lawyers are not evidence." R. 342; see Kohl,
2000 UT 35, at f 24.
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reasons. "To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [defendant] must meet the heavy burden of
showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). As
discussed above, the prosecutor's argument was not improper, and therefore, counsel had no
reason to object. "' [Fjailure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile
if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.'" Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,
1109 (Utah 1983) (quotingState v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,58 (Utah 1982)); accord Whittle,
1999 UT 96, at f 34. Strategic decisions, like counsel made here, also preclude a claim of
ineffective assistance. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f 19. Finally, because the prejudice
showing required to establish ineffective assistance is comparable to harmfulness showing
required under plain error analysis, defendant also fails to meet the second prong of his
ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,124 n. 15 (Utah 1989).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted this 131 day of July, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

lY S. GRAY
DISTANT ATTORNEVGENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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Addenda

Addendum 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution. Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy therightto a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann, g 76-2-202 (1999)
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. $ 78-24-1 (1996)
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter,
who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons
who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor
those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their
opinions on matters of religious belief; although, in every case the credibility of
the witness may be drawn in question, by the manner in which he testifies, by the
character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his character for truth,
honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by contradictory evidence; and the jury
are the exclusive judges of his credibility.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-2 (1996)
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

COURT RULES

Utah R. Crim. P. 17
* * *

(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received
as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any notes
of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any
other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the
verdict agreed upon.
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded.
The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having
the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response
thereto shall be entered in the record.
* * *

Utah R. Crim. P. 18
* * *

(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is
sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be
made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel and hearings
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken first by the
prosecution and then by the defense.

UtahR. Crim. P. 18(cont)
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised
separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged
to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would
befreeof favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because
he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action,
or having complained against or having been accused by him in a criminal
prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and
whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the
case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant
for the act charged as an offense;

Utah R. Crim. P. 18(cont)
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the juror
from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction regardless of the
facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on
of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on
the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding
such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
* * *

Addendum 2

1

A.

I would think that what they say is true and yeah.

2

Q.

And that would be because of your friendship with

3

those witnesses--

4

A.

And my background with them.

5

Q.

— a n d your knowledge of them in the past.

6

A.

Right.

7

Q.

And if one witness that was your friend would

8

testify as to one thing and another witness would testify as

9

to something opposite, you'd be more likely to believe the

0

witness who is your friend because you've known them in the

1

past; right?

L2

A.

I would.

L3

MR. McCAUGHEY:

That's all.

L4

MZ. MORGAN:

L5

THE COURT:

L6

you do not need to come back.

I don't have anything, Your Honor.
Okay.

Mz. Francom, you are excused and
Thank you.

L7

THE WITNESS:

L8

THE COURT:

19

(Bailiff summonsed candidate from outside
courtroom.)
ALBERT EUGENE STEELE

20
21
22

Ask Albert Eugene Steele as to come in.

called by the Court, having been duly
II

sworn, was voir dired as follows:

23

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

24
25

Thank you.

BY THE COURT:
Q.

Mr. Steele, I f ve read your questionnaire and so have
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

the attorneys and I want to go right as to the last question.

2

You said that there is a reason why you believe you could not

3

be impartial as a juror in this case.

4

personal friends with both the Callihams and the

5

Hollingsworths; is that right.

You say you're close

6

A.

That's correct.

7

Q.

You think that would make it impossible for you to

8
9
10
11
12

be fair as to both the State and the defense in this case.
A.

I think that I could be fair, but I think that I

would have a very hard time, ah, serving in that capacity.
Q.

Well if—if the only thing that happens is that

you're really uncomfortable,—

13

A.

That's basically it.

14

Q.

—okay.

15

A.

Well I think I could be fair and impartial about

16
17

You think you could still do your duty?

what is presented to me.
Q.

Let's suppose the evidence—let's suppose it was not

18

these two that were on trial, but somebody else that you don't

19

know at all.

20

you think they're guilty.

21

I guess you'd find them guilty if you thought they were

22

guilty.

23

grandchildren of people you know who are close personal

24

friends?

25

A.

Let's suppose that the evidence is—comes in and
With the defendants you don't know,

Would you hesitate to do that because these are

I would hesitate, yes.
J. M. LIDDELL

But beyond a reasonable

doubt, I think that the courts are set up to that way and
that's what I believed all my life.

If it was beyond a

reasonable doubt, then I think that I would have to.
Q.

As a practical matter, would that be a different

beyond a reasonable doubt, though with these defendants than
with some other defendants, simply because of who you know?
Would you stop one more time and say, "Wait a minute. I
really want to be sure this time."
say, "I'm sorry.

Or would you go ahead and

I have to let the chips fall where they may.

I'm findin' these guys guilty."
A.

This is basically what the court system is set up

for and what I believe very strongly.

I think any juror has

to weigh the evidence presented to him, whether it's he knows
them or whether he doesn't, you know, and it's a very
difficult thing to find anybody, I think, guilty of any crime.
I think that's a very strong thing to put on anybody's
shoulders.

And I think as a jury I would have to look twice

no matter who the person was.
Q.

Okay.

Would it be irrelevant to you—ultimately

would it be irrelevant to you that you know the grandparents?
A.

Basically and honestly I think that it might affect

me in the very long run either way.
the questionnaire.

That's why I put that on

I know these people.

They're my friends.

There's a difference from between to me of being somebody
else's friend and their being my friend.
J. M. LIDDELL

I consider them my
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friends.
THE COURT:

2

Okay.

That's why we asked the question.

3

Um, I think I'm gonna let him go.

4

change that?
MR. McCAUGHEY:

5
6

If I could just ask a couple of

questions.
THE COURT:

7

Mr. McCaughey.

DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. McCAUGHEY:

9
10

Somebody want to try to

Q.

Mr. Steele, the Court's going to tell you that in

11

order to at least to presume innocent, in order to convict

12

them, you have to find it beyond a reasonable doubt that they

13

did that.

14

gonna tell you.

That's the standard they're going to—the Court's
Do you think you could follow that standard?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And if the State put on enough evidence and you were

17

convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, you could find these two

18

guilty?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And that's no matter whether you were friends with

21

the grandparents or not, you would still try to follow what

22

that Judge told you to d o —

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

—and weigh that evidence?

25

And you're confidence

you could do that?—
J. M. LIDDELL
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A.

Yes.

Q.

—even though it would be difficult?

A.

Even though it' 3 difficult.

Q.

It is difficult in any case, as you sa^

A.

On any case.

Q.

— t o convict any anybody of a crime.

A,

Correct.

Q.

But you could follow that according to the Court's

instruction?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And as says Court said, "Let the chips fall where

they may. 11

If they prove him guilty, beyond a reasonable

doubt, fi nd him guilty.

If they don't, find him not guilty.

You could do that?
A.

That's correct.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

Okay.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q.

You were a law <
enforcement officer, but. youfre

retired now?
A.

That's correct.
THE COURT: Mr. Halls, do you want to ask a ny

additiona 1 questions?
MR. HALLS: All right.
PLAINTIFF',S VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
J. M. LIDDELL
OFFICIAL REPORTER
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1
2

BY MR. HALLS:
Q.

Mr. Steele, you recognize that for you to be a

3

competent juror your responsibility is to be fair and

4

impartial to both sides.

5

A.

That is correct.

6

Q.

I've written a couple of notes here from your

7

conversation.

8

guilty of a crime.

9
10
11
12

A.

You said it would be difficult to find anyone
That's a difficult task.

That is a difficult task, but if it's what's

presented, I think you have to go with what's presented.
Q.

Okay.

And I've made—this is my comment.

I've

written here that you would hesitate to convict.

13

A.

Would I hesitate to convict?

14

Q.

I've written that and I'm gonna follow that up with

15

this statement.

16

a victim, if you were a person sitting—I guess what I am

17

saying is on the State's side of this case, with your

18

knowledge that you are close friends with the Hollingsworths

19

and close friends with the Callihams, are you gonna be the

20

type of juror that would give the State—the victims in this

21

case a pair fair and impartial jury?

22

reluctant to convict and so uncomfortable to face your friends

23

that you would hesitate to the point where you're not being

24

fair and impartial to the State's position?

25

A.

If you are a victim in this case—if you were

I don't believe so.

Or are you gonna be so

I think that whatever is

J. M. LIDDELL
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presented, I will look at it fairly.

If they are my friends

2

and they hear the same evidence, they will understand why I'd

3

do this.

4

this.

5

being in here and sitting here, I think probably the worst

6

thing that I could think of is if I wasn't convinced and

7

everybody else was, it would not be fair to the defendants for

8

me to hang this hearing.

9

think that everybody in there is going to have to have enough

10

evidence presented that they will believe beyond a reasonable

11

doubt.

12

clear cut where you have whether you have that reasonable

13

doubt or not basically.

14

either present much more evidence to or against and so I think

15

that, you know, in order to be fair and impartial, you have to

16

look at both sides.

17

that would be a disservice if I didn't believe that there was

18

a reasonable doubt to go ahead with the State.

19

believe that there's a reasonable doubt in my own heart, I

20

would have to rule the other way.

21

through my mind ever since I got this summons.

22

One of the things—and I think I should tell you

One of the things that I have really thought about

Q.

I don't think I could do that.

I

I don't think this is going—in most juries it is very

I have found that, you know, you'll

And I have thought about that and I think

If I did

And this is what's gone

Maybe this is editorial here.

It's you made a

23

comment about if the family members are sitting here listening

24

to the evidence, they are going to know you did the right

25

thing one way or another because they're gonna to hear the
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

same evidence you did.

2

parents, for instance, or close family members are dealing

3

with family members, that they're totally rational in what

4

they hear and what they believe their kids have done or not

5

done?

6

A.

Is it your experience that when

Well I find that most parents hate to believe that

7

their children could do anything, but yet they're our parents.

8

And I'm a parent.

9

parents, deep in their heart, are rational enough to know

10
11

that.

My children do things.

I believe that most

That is my own opinion.

Q.

If there is a situation where the Hollingsworths or

12

the Callihams hear this testimony, you believe that it may

13

show guilt, they believe that it doesn't, that's gonna place

14

you in a difficult situation.

15

jeopardy, are you gonna hesitate to make a verdict of guilty?

16

A.

17

either way.

If your friendship is in

I don't think my friendship would be in jeopardy

18

MR. HALLS:

19

THE COURT: Any more?

20

MR. McCAUGHEY:

21

M2. MORGAN:

22

THE COURT:

I have nothing further.

No.

Nothing.

Nothing.
Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Steele, what we are going to

23

see is I'm going to excuse from you the courtroom.

24

to wait.

25

door for a few minutes and then we'll tell you whether you

Go out through this door.

J. M. LIDDELL

I want you

Just wait outside of the
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need to come back here at 3:00 o'clock or whether you don't
need to come back at all.

If you come back at 3:00, you might

want to call to be sure that we really need you.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
(Candidate left courtroom.)
THE COURT:

You challenge him for cause, Mr. Halls.

MR. HALLS:

Your Honor, I would like to challenge

Mr. Steele for cause.
THE COURT:
this one.

Let me tell you where I think I am with

He's obviously given it a lot of thought and I

think he's, ah, persuaded himself that he can be impartial.
But he's, you know, he's made some statements that he hasn't
completely retracted, which might give us a concern both ways
actually.

He said he didn't think he could hang a jury if

everybody else was convinced and he wasn't because he would
worry that he was affected by the relationship.

He also said

that he didn't think he could consider it totally irrelevant.
Now Mr. McCaughey rehabilitated him some.
I'd really be stickin' my neck out if I kept a juror
with these answers against a defense challenge.

I think I'm

probably gonna postpone deciding on Mr. Steele to see if I
absolutely have to have him.

I can maybe reason through to

where he would be a good juror, an impartial juror.

And in

fact, he may have thought about this so much that he would be
one of the—the most impartial jurors.
J. M. LIDDELL

But he's awful close.
PAHF

SQ

You could tell itfs just hitting him real close to his heart.
So Ifm probably gonna end up excusing Mr. Steele.

Tell Mr.

Steele to come back at 3:00 o'clock.
Let's get Beverly—hang on.
Yanito show up.

We just had Harold

Come and get his questionnaires, counsel.

Harold Yanito.
(Bailiff summonsed witness from outside courtroom.)
HAROLD YANITO
called by the Court, having been duly
sworn, was voir dired as follows:
THE COURT:

Mr, Yanito, come up here and sit in this

chair, please,
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q.

Did you take the oath earlier?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

We have your questionnaire answers.

you did hear something about this case on the radio.

You say
What did

you hear?
A.

Ah, it's been awhile so I really don't remember.

It

just went through and I didn't really listen to it. As far as
I know, I just heard it and that was it, so.
Q.

Someone had been—you knew someone had been killed

and not just died.
A.

I couldn't tell you what exactly was said.
J. M. LIDDELL

But I
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1

my clerks, pursuant to my guidelines.

2

Richard Max Bailey was excused earlier.

3

Rosalie Reilly; are you gonna try to rehabilitate

4

her?

5

MZ. MORGAN:

6

MR. HALLS:

Did you say that Mr. Dutchie was

8

THE COURT:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

Good luck.

7

Absolutely.

excused?

MR. McCAUGHEY:

10

My clerk excused him.

Is there anything as to presumption?

11

ROSALIE REILLY

12

called by the Court, having been duly

13

sworn, was voir dired as follows:

14

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:

•15
16

Q.

M z . Reilly, you said y o u — i f you had to try the

17

youngest defendant, if you had to be a juror in his case, you

18

couldn't; is that true?

19
20
21

A.

Well I think I would have a hard time being

impartial, because of his youth.
Q.

You said in your questionnaire, "I wouldn't be able

22

to pass judgment."

23

have a hard time"?

24
25

A.

Is it "I wouldn't be able to"? or "I would

I've given a lot of thought to this.

I think I

would have a hard time.
J. M. LIDDELL
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Q.

Okay.

And youfve discussed motions with Happy

Morgan?
A.

Yes, I have.

I believe it was a change of venue.

She asked me how to do that and I gave her some ideas. We
didn't go into the specifics of the pleas.
Q.

Urn, you also say that you know a child who was close

to the victim and he was quite upset about what had happened.
That might color you; might lead you to be more harsh.
A.

Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I think I'm going to excuse her.

You may try to rehabilitate, if you'd like.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

Why don't you give us a shot, Your

Honor.
DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. McCAUGHEY:
Q.

Are you saying then—let me understand—that you

don't think you could listen to the evidence in this case and
listen to Judge Anderson's instructions and be a fair and
impartial juror?
A.

I thought—I think it would be difficult, but I

think I would do that.

I certainly do that in other context.

In my own practice of law I do that where I set my feelings
aside.
Q.

A lot of things we do are real difficult to do.

A.

Yes.
J. M. LIDDELL
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Q.

But your statement is that in spite of that

difficulty, you could follow his instruction then you could
listen to the evidence and be a fair and impartial juror to
both sides.
A.

I think so.

I think probably more so in this type

of case I would be fair to both sides.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

Okay.

That's all I have.

DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MZ. MORGAN:
Q.

The motion for change of venue that we discussed,

that was more than six months ago; correct?
A.

I can't even remember.

But I'm sure it was quite a

while ago.
Q.

And I asked you if you had ever done one in this

county and you couldn't find one, so weren't sure?
A.

Right.

Q.

And that's about the extent of the conversation that

we had.
A.

I don't recall the whole conversation, but that

sounds right.
Q.

So I didn't, urn, talk to you specifically about

anything with my case.

I was just asking if you had some sort

of a form.
A.

Yes.
MZ. MORGAN:

Urn, that's all I have, Your Honor.

J. M. LIDDELL
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THE COURT:

Mr. Halls.

PLAINTIFF'S VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. HALLS:
Q.

Mz. Reilly, we!ve had a number of cases together.

A,

True.

Q.

You could look at me and cock your head sideways.

You disagree with how I prosecute a number of cases; is that
correct?
A.

Well I think that's kind of an over generalization.

I disagree with the approach of your office to drug cases.
Q.

Your comment on those has been anybody—that in a

first time offense, that we ought to have it just an across
the board policy of doing a plea and abeyance on all drug
cases.
A.

Pretty much giving them a second chance, yes.

Q.

And by my not doing that Ifm ruining the lives of

these young people?
A.

I probably have said that to you.

I don't remember

the words.
Q.

And is that—we have a person here who's what, 17

years ago old?

No prior record.

A.

This isn't a drug case.

Q.

No.

But you don't have some of the same feelings on

a case with a youthful defendant?
A.

I think it's harder with a youthful defendant and
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

that was what I was trying to indicate in my answer.

2

don't think that it automatically, because of someone's youth,

3

means they should be entitled to a second chance, no matter

4

what.

5
6

Q.

But I

Urn, you also believe that officers don't testify

honestly.

7

A.

In my experience I've had that happen.

8

Q.

Well it's not just that you've had it happen.

9

You

think that it's common place.

10

A.

I don't know that I put that it's common place.

11

Q.

Well you didn't.

12

A.

I think it happens.

13

Q.

A lot.

14

A.

I don't know if I would qualify it as a lot. I

15
16

That's my word.

But you think—

think they're the same as any other witness.
Q.

Well—and I don't know that I want you to get into

17

any specifics either, but when it talks about how you feel

18

about prosecutors, you say no generalized feelings, only

19

specifics.

20

kind of locked horns on different things; is that right?

You have specific incidences with me where we've

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And you have—you have some difficulties, urn—well,

23

would it be fair to say that you have some animosities because

24

of those?

25

A.

I don't think that would be fair.
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

Q.

What would be fair?

2

A.

I think that we have differences of opinion and

3

sometimes it gets heated.

4

get said.

5

Q.

It's a heated battle when things

But I don't think there's anything specific to you.
You indicate on the very back page here that you

6

know a person who is close to the victim and you feel that

7

that may color or there may be some sympathy or concern

8

because of that?

9

A.

Yes.

I have a friend who has a son and they moved

10

from Blanding to the Dove Creek area and I talked to him one

11

day and he was pretty torn up about the death of this—of the

12

victim in this case. And that impacted me and I thought out

13

of fairness I needed to say that.

14

fact that he was so upset.

15

Q.

I had a hard time with the

The second thing on the back page indicates

16

that—well maybe I ought to follow that up a little bit. I

17

perceive that maybe you're saying that because of how upset

18

they were, and so forth, you have some empathy more for the

19

victim because of that reason.

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

And then the next one says that because of the age

22

of Jordan Calliham, you're aware that if he's convicted, he's

23

gonna go to prison because of the offense.

24

A.

That would be my guess.

25

Q.

And you say here he'll most likely be victimized and
J. M. LIDDELL

1

for that reason you feel you wouldn't be able to pass

2

judgment?

3

A.

I think it would be real hard.

I was just trying to

4

be fair on either side.

5

such a hard time by the death where he was crying, I think

6

that I had a lot of empathy for that. And then at the same

7

time, I think it's hard to make a decision when someone's sent

8

up and feeling like a decision against him or making a harsh

9

judgment would effect him for the rest of his life.

10

Q.

In terms of my friend's son that had

Even though there may be an instruction that says

11

you shouldn't be concerned about what the—what the sentence

12

would be.

13

A.

Right.

14

Q.

But that—you've indicated here honestly that that

15
16

I understand that absolutely.

would be in your mind.
A.

I just tried to indicate anything that I thought

17

might make me not an impartial juror.

18

would be definitely the way I would go.

19

listen to judge Anderson's instructions.

20

MR. HALLS:

21

MZ. MORGAN:

22

I don't know that that
I think I could

I have nothing further, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I have a couple, if the

court doesn't mind.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm getting a—one of the things

24

that happens when I let the lawyers ask questions, it goes

25

longer.
J. M. LIDDELL
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MZ. MORGAN:

I111 talk fast, I promise.

I won't

talk that fast.
FURTHER DEFENSE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MZ. MORGAN:
Q.

Mr. Halls has indicated that you and he have had

some cases where you and he have locked horns.

Itfs also true

that you and I have had a lot of cases where you and I lock
horns; correct?
A.

That's true.

Q.

And it's true that you work Jfor Legal Services and

you typically are representing women who are accusing a man of
some sort of violent act toward them?
A.

For abuse yes.

Q.

And so very often I'm on the other side of that.

A.

Almost consistently you're on the other side.

Q.

Do you think that you would hold that against me in

1 this hear ing any more or less than you would hold against
Crai<3?
A.

No.

Q.

And if Mr. Halls were to present to you a case

beyond a reasonable doubt that either of these individuals was
guil ty of this crime, would you be able to find them guilty?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Absolutely?

A.

Yes.
J . M. LIDDELL
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MZ. MORGAN:

That's all I have, Your Honor.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY THE COURT:
Q.

How did you know there was a younger defendant?

A.

Ifve been in court before when there's been motions

and I noticed them.
Q.

What kinds of motions have we considered when you've

been in court?
A.
waiting.

I can't ever remember what they were.

I was

And there are a few cases or I think a few times

where I had something on the docket and the Calliham matter
come up afterwards and I remember seeing them from that. I
don't specifically remember the motions.

I just remember

being struck by the youth of both defendants actually.
Q.

How did you know the victim—how did the victim die,

as far as you know?

Do you know how the victim died?

A.

No.

Q.

Was it from knife wounds?

a tire iron?

Or shot?

Hit by a car?

What?

A.

Shot is the only thing I was aware of.

Q.

You heard shot.

out?

Or hit by

Did you know how the police found

Got evidence to prosecute these two defendants; did you

know?
A.

No.

Q.

You don't know anything about who might be
J. M. LIDDELL

1

testifying against them?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Do you have any idea of how they may have got the

4

weapons?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Do you know what punishment is fixed by law for

7

murder?

8

A.

No,

9

Q.

You don't?

10

A.

Not right off the top.

11

involved murder before.

12

case.

13

Q.

I've never done a case that

I know that this is not a capital

So do you know anything about the possible kinds of

14

crimes there are?

What possible punishments there are?

15

don't know that about the Utah sentencing scheme?

You

16

A.

Um-um.

17

Q.

You don't know whether there is a felony or a

18

misdemeanor?

19

A.

Oh, I know it's a felony.

20

Q.

And you don't know whether it's—do you know what

21

I've never looked at it and I don't.

kinds of felonies Utah has?

22

A.

Yes, I do.

23

Q.

What kinds does it have?

24

A.

It's a first degree felony.

25

Q.

So you know it's a First Degree Felony.
J. M. LIDDELL
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A,

Right.

Q.

Do your do you know what the punishment is for the

First Degree Felony?
A.

Well I think it's 15 to life.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But I know that there's different circumstancess the

Judge may consider and I don't know, under in these
circumstances, what the Court would.
THE COURT:
for her.

Okay.

I don't have any more questions

Anything for you?
Just step outside this door.

We'll let you know in

a second whether or not you need to come back.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
(Candidate left courtroom.)
THE COURT:

I think I'm gonna let Mz. Reilly go.

She knows more than we would permit any other juror to know.
The Court of appeals has reversed a conviction because a
Bailiff talked to a juror and said, "When we have six jurors,
we're trying a Class-A Misdemeanor.

When we have eight

jurors, we're trying a felony," and from that the juror would
then infer from other jurors whether it was a misdemeanor or a
felony.

She knows this is a First Degree Felony.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

She doesn't know the penalty,

though.
THE COURT:

Huh?

J. M. LIDDELL
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1

MR. McCAUGHEY:

2

THE COURT:

She doesn't know the penalty

She's wrong on whether it's 15 to life

3

or not, but she knows that it's a First Degree Felony.

4

there's all these other problems.

5

briefly?

6
7

MR. McCAUGHEY:

So anything you want to say

I think my position is I think she

qualifies and she ought to stay on the jury panel.

8

THE COURT:

9

MZ. MORGAN:

10

And

THE COURT:

Okay.
And mine would be the same, Your Honor.
That was kind of the straw that broke

11

the camel's back for Mz. Reilly.

12

might Judge the defendants more harshly; and then in her

13

questionnaire she said, "I wouldn't be able to pass judgment

14

on the younger defendant."

15

She's given reasons why she

She's been in court during some of the motions.

She

16

has a relationship, which is not necessarily very good, with

17

two of the lawyers involved in the case, so I'm going to

18

excuse her, unless you want me to keep her, Mr. Halls.

19

all agree, I'll leave her on.

20
21

MR. HALLS:

I don't, Your Honor.

If you

I'm just glad

we're gonna be left without me saying anything.

22

MR. McCAUGHEY:

23

THE COURT:

24

two of you together.

25

to come back.

Ha-ha, ha-ha, ha.

Okay.

I've been in court and seen the

Tell her she can go.

J. M. LIDDELL

She doesn't need
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Addendum 3

) 0 <fi

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PSYCHIATRIC
EVALUATION

vs.
Case No.

JORDAN CALLIHAM
TERRIL CALLIHAM
MISTY ERNST,

9917-70
9917-69
9917-68

Defendant.
Defendant Jordan Calliham

("Jordan") has filed a motion

requesting that Misty Ernst ("Misty"), the state1s witness, be
ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation with a Dr. Featherstone
to address whether:
1.

Misty has a propensity to lie due to mental illness or

personality disorder.
2.

Misty is able to separate fantasy from reality.

3.

Misty has a mental illness or personality disorder which

alters her ability to remember events as they occurred.
4.

Misty is delusional due to mental illness or personality

disorder.
5. Misty has difficulty, due to mental illness or personality
disorder, separating dreams from reality.
6.

Misty1s admitted hallucinations would impact her ability

to accurately recall events.

7. The false recounting of an event would eventually imprint
false memories on Mistyfs mind.
Jordan points to the following as supporting his request:
1.

At the preliminary hearing, Misty admitted to difficulty

distinguishing reality from dreams.
2. At the preliminary hearing, Misty admitted hallucinating.
3. Misty went from uncontrollable crying to giggling and
joking during a short time period during the preliminary hearing.
4.

Misty admitted using marijuana.

5. Misty

admitted

that

her

parents

would

consider

her

untruthful.
Misty has objected to the motion.
position.

The state has not stated a

Misty opposes the motion because Mistyfs responses at

the preliminary hearing are explained by her angst at testifying
against Jordan, a former paramour, by the horrible details of the
crime, by her desire to protect Jordan, and by her emotional
turmoil.

Her hallucinations are explained as "vivid nightmares"

and her admission of truthfulness as her recognition that she had
lied to her parents about her drug use.
The court has read the transcript of the preliminary hearing.
No audiotape or videotape was made at the hearing.
The most recent pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court in
this area is State v. Bakalov, the primary prosecution witness
suffered

from

disassociative

identity

disorder

("DID").

Characteristics of DID include amnesia and memory gaps. Competing
multiple personalities, each with its own behavior pattern and

2

memories, compete for dominance within the patient.

The Supreme

Court ruled that evidence of mental illness is material when it may
reasonably cast doubt on the witness1 ability or willingness to
tell the truth.

The court therefore decided that the prosecutor

should have disclosed the DID.

However, since it was established

after trial that the witness1 ability to recall the crime in
question had not been affected by her illness, the conviction was
affirmed.
In this case, the only hint of mental illness is the adoption
by the witness of defense counsel's characterization of her dreams
as "hallucinations."

There is no evidence of mental illness

preceding the crime. The transcript does not suggest to the court
that Misty suffers from mental illness.

To the contrary, Misty

appears capable of distinguishing between what happened, what she
dreamed,

what

she worried

about, what

she told

officers on

different occasions, what she wanted to say, what she heard from
others, and what Jordan and his brother might want her to say. If
the court were to order a psychiatric examination based on Misty's
preliminary hearing testimony, an examination would be required in
virtually all cases.
Jordan's suggestion that a psychiatric examination might
disclose a propensity to lie runs up against the prohibition
against using expert witnesses as human lie detectors. Similarly,
though Jordan is entitled to introduce reputation testimony about
Misty's credibility, he is probably not entitled to attack her
credibility with an expert psychiatric witness unless a mental
3

illness has been established.

Absent evidence of actual mental

illness, the court will not order an examination to fish for it.
The motion is denied.
DATED the

day of September, 1999.

ict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed true and ORDER DENYING
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION, postage prepaid, to the following:
Craig C. Halls
San Juan County Attorney
PO Box 850
Monticello, UT 84535

Happy Morgan
Attorney at Law
8 S. 100 E.
Moab, UT 84532

William Schultz
Attorney at Law
PO Box 937
Moab, UT 84532

Kristine Rogers
Attorney at Law
10 W. 100 S., Suite 605
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

DATED the sffi^ day of September, 1999.

)eputy Cou
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Addendum 4

INSTRUCTION NO.

N

The testimony of Michael Gentry, Michael Mulvey, Adrian Killsinsight and Richard Raso
has been admitted against only Jordan Calliham and not admitted against Terrii Calliham.
Do not consider this evidence against Terrii Calliham.

17

Instruction No.

IS

Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
At the time this evidence was admitted you were instructed that it could not be
considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.
Do not consider this evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was
admitted.
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SAN JUAN COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE
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Ewent NlUBblr:
2S3ifcfc
Nare ID; &00O13974
I Lasti KILLSINSIGWT
1 Addr: 33* W 400 3
I City: BLANDIN6
i

ST: UT

Zip:

Tine/Date of Event! 09:32:37 01/04/0®
Type of ev*nt: ADto Administrative
Quantity;
£• 00
Officers GRAYSON REDD
Booking Nueber*
Description:
<See below)
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DOB: 1*8/15/81
SSNs
- Treatment Datei ^^s^_i
Instructions

/

S<^i JAMES EATON HOMICIDE-CASE #9904-93
On December 33 f 1999, I Interviewed Adrian Kill*insight in
Blanding, Utah.
Adrian stated the followingi
1.
Jordan stated that he was in jail enarged with aurder.
S. Jordan stated that ne was suppose to have killed a boy fro* Dove
Creek.
3. Jordan stated that his girlfriend had said they went out in the
woods to do the killing.
I told Adrian that I thought he knew eore. I told hi* that I was told
that Jordan had showed hie the hand notions of how he had held the gun.
At that point7 Adrian stated that he did not want to testify. He
further stated, "Do you think I want to get shot full of holes?"
Adrian*» mother was present and told him how important it is to tell the
truth.
Adrian then told us the following*
1. Jordan stated he had killed the victi*.
2.
Jordan stated that they went into the woods and "shot him up."
3. Adri an deaonstrated to me how Jordan held his hand while stating
that they had shot hin up. Adrian held his pointer and eiddle
finger forward and thueb in the air. He then turned his hand
sideways.
^,
Jordan stated that he shot hie 10 tine*.
S. Jordan stated that he "capped hie Because his owed hie $300 for

vr-

/
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I

First; MICHAEL
Mid: JQHN> i
Phone: (331)
I
DOBs 99/13/79
SSN: 343-96-3156 »
I

Tine/Date of Events 0S:07si0 12/89/99
Treatment Date;
Type of event: ADM Adainistrative Instructions
Quantity:
9. M
Officeri GRAYSON BBDD
Booking Number;
Description:
(See below)

t
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Description!
REGARDING JAWE8 EATON HOMICIDE-CASE *99®4~93
I interviewed Michael Mulvey by telephone on Deceabtr £7 f 1999 at
1009 hrst He releated the following to me while he was housed with
Jordan Calliha*.
1. Jordan stated to hi© that hef his brother, and his girlfrxeno took
the vietie to a "country road".
2. Jordan stated that hef his brother, and girlfriend were present when
the victia was killed*
3- Jordan stated that he wanted to take the rap so his brother
could get off.
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Fr-i Dec 24 09:81x25 WST 1999-INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD RASG II / ^ v ^
"" I interviewed Richard Raso on Deceeber 23 at 1&8Q hours at the San
Juan County jail»
Richard has lived with Jordan Callihae the last
two nonths* Richard stated to ae the following:
l*
i. Jordan told hie that the killing was over aoney owed hia for a 1/4*
warijuana.
2. Jordan stated to hia that he, his brother, and his girlfriend took
the victim on a road between Montieello and the Colorado state line
and shot hie 19 tiaes. Jordan also stated that he and his brother
took the victia while the girl stayed at the vehicle.
3. Jordan stated that the victim was his best friend but that he got
what he deserved*
4. Jordan stated that one of the guns was a Saith and Wesson 9 an Sigea
and told Raso "How can Zftoy find the gun when it was burned up".
5. Jordan stated that after the shooting hie and his brother split up
and went in different directions.
6. Raso demonstrated the action Jordan showed hi« he used in the
shooting of the fireara, pointing the pointer finger forward and the
thuab up. He then turned the gun on its side while indicating a
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shooting notion with his hand.
Jordan denonstated to Raso the body notions of the victie as he was
being shot. The victim was standing with his a m i in front of his
chest, ooving backwards, with alternating shoulders shifting
backwards. Raso used the word "he vibrated" in describing how
Jordan appeared as he was deaonstating how the victia looked while
he was shooting.
Jordan showed Raso the area he shot the victie by using his hands,
covering and area froa the hips up to the shoulders.
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Addendum 6

A.

My name is Michael Mulvey.

Ifm presently living in

Washington State.
Q.

Mike, were you a resident oJI the San Juan County of

this facility as a county prisoner—
A.

Yes, sir.

I was.

Q.

— i n the last six months?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Were you in this facility during the same time that

I was.

Jordan Calliham was in this facility?
A.

Yes, sir.

I was.

Q.

Were you housed in the same cellblock as Mr.

Call iham?
A.

Yes, sir.

I was.

Q.

Do you recall having a conversation with Deputy

Grayson Redd about some comments that were made to you by
Jordan Calliham?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Do you recall approximately when that was?

been in the last couple of weeks?

Last month?

Has that

What?

A.

Yeah.

Last couple of weeks,

Q.

Did you make a statement to Mr. Redd, with regard to

what you heard?
A.

Yes, sir.

I did.

Q.

Can you tell us the context of the statements that

were made to you by Jordan?
J.

Did you ask him something?

M. LIDDELL
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1

A.

No.

I was curious why he was in here cause I mean

2

he looked like a younger individual for being in the county

3

jail, you know.

4
5

Q.

Okay.

So my question was did you ask him that

question?

6

A.

Yes, sir.

7

Q.

All right.

I did.
Did you make the statement to Grayson

8

Redd that Jordan Calliham stated to you that he and his

9

girlfriend took a victim to a country road?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you make a statement to Grayson Redd that Jordan

12

Calliham said to you that he and his girlfriend were present

13

when the victim was killed?

14

A.

Yes, sir.

15

Q.

And were those statements made to you by Jordan

16
17

Calliham?
A.

Yes, sir.

18

MR. HALLS:

I have nothing further.

19

THE COURT:

Any questions, Mr. McCaughey?

20

MR. McCAUGHEY:

21

THE COURT:

22

MZ. MORGAN:

23

Any questions, Mz. Morgan?
Yes.
CROSS EXAMINATION

24
25

No.

BY MZ. MORGAN:
Q.

How old are you?
J. M. LIDDELL

A.

Ifm 20.

Q.

20 years old?

A.

Yes, mam.

Q.

And you were doing how much time?

A.

42 days.

Q.

42 days for—?

A.

DUI.

|

MR. HALLS:

I really think, Your Honor, that that's

probably not something that should have come because it's—
THE COURT:

Yeah.

That's really—that's not

admissibl e.
MR. HALLS:

But he was in jail.

They know he was in

THE COURT:

Not much harm done.

That's not

jail.

admissibl e.
Q

BY MZ. MORGAN:

You were in the county section;

correct?
THE WITNESS:
Q.

Yes mam.

And so all the beds are in there and everybody has

access to everybody else's stuff?
A.

Pretty much.

Yes, mam.

Q.

So if Jordan Calliham had his paper work, his legal

paper wor k, his discovery information that I would have sent
to him under his bed, you would have had access
correct?
J . M. LIDDELL

to that;

1

A.

No mam.

2

Q.

And why is that?

3

A.

Because he had a lot of friends in the county jail.

4

Q.

But the paper work was under the bed; correct?

5

A.

Yes, man.

6

Q.

And there were times when you were in the room and

7

Jordan was outside of the room, for example, visiting;

8

correct?

9

A.

Yes, mam.

10

Q,

You have some felony convictions on your record;

11

correct?

12

A.

Juvenile record.

13

Q.

And they were for what?

14

A.

Burglaries.

15

Q.

And this last sentence that youfve just served, you

16

Yes, mam.

were released 10 days early; correct?

17

A.

Urn—

18

Q.

You got good time credit for 10 days?

19

A.

No, mam.

20

Q.

You didn't get good time credit?

21

A.

No, I didn't.

22

I had to pay an extra—I believe it

was an extra $50 to get out a day early.

23

Q.

But you didn't also get 10 days good time.

24

A,

Not that I was aware of.

25

Q.

Did you serve 42 days?
J. M. LIDDELL
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1
2

I

A

*

Yes, mam.

Or actually I served 41 days in the

county jail.

3

MZ. MORGAN:

4

MR. HALLS:

5

No further questions.
No further questions.

May this witness

be excused?

6

THE COURT: Yes.

7

MR. HALLS:

8

(Bailiff summoned witness from outside courtroom.)

9

MR. HALLS:

10

Your Honor, we call Richard Raso.

Stand right here and be sworn.

And then

you'll have to sit right there.

11

RICHARD RASO

12

called by the Plaintiff, having been duly

13

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

14

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

15

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be

16

the tru th, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help

17

you God 7

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

I do.

Sit over here, Mr. Raso.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

BY MR. HALLS:

21
22

Q.

State your name and where you reside.

23

A.

My name is Richard Raso.

24

Q.

Mr. Raso, have you been a former resident of the San

25

I live in Salt Lake City.

Juan County Jail?
J. M. LIDDELL
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A.

Urn, yes.

Q.

Were you in the county jail at the same time that

Jordan Calliham was in the county jail?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you share some cell space or did you share

what—what do you call it?

Your house?

Did you share your

room?
A.

Yeah.

My room with him, yeah.

A couple of times.

Q.

During the time that you shared space with him, did

he make any statements to you about the reason for him being
in the San Juan County Jail?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And how did that come up.

the statements.

He told me why he was here.

But did you ask him?

Ifm not asking you for
Did he volunteer it?

How did that come up?
A.

Urn, just when you sit in jail, you know, people talk

and ask each other questions and stuff and that's how it came
up.
Q,

Mr. Raso, I think I was the reason why you were in

jail, but I can't remember whether it was for a felony or not.
Were you in for a felony?
A.

It started out that way and I pleaded down to a

misdemeanor.

So I was in jail for—actually I was in jail for

a probation violation.
Q.

All right.

And do you recall having an interview

J . M. LIDDELL
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I

with Grayson Redd about the statements that Mr. Jordan
Calliham made to you?
A.

Yeah.

It was like—

THE COURT:

Would you just move up and a little

closer to that microphone so we can here better?
THE WITNESS:

it was like—it was like two weeks

ago.
Q

BY MR. HALLS:

Okay.

that the jury can here this.

We are trying to make sure
Ifm looking at a note here that

said it was on December 23rd.
A.

Yeah.

It was.

Q.

Does that—does that seem—that was right?

A.

Um-hm.

Q.

All right.

Do you recall telling Grayson Redd that

Jordan told you that the killing was over money owed him for a
quarter pound of marijuana?
A.

He told me that's what he was being charged with,

yeah.
Q.

Okay.

So he made that statement with you?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

Do you recall telling Grayson Redd that

Jordan stated that he, his girlfriend took the victim on a
road between Monticello and the Colorado state line, shot him
19 times, and that while that was occurring his girlfriend had
stayed at the vehicle?

Did you make that statement to Grayson

J. M. LIDDELL

PACK

Ififi

Redd?
A.

Ah, I told him that--

Q.

I!m asking if you made that statement.

A.

Yes.

Q.

That can be answered by a yes or no.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember Jordan stating to you—did you state

to Grayson Redd that Jordan stated to you that the victim was
his best friend, but that he got what he deserved?
A.

Yes.

He told me he was his best friend.

Q.

Did Jordan tell you that the gun was a Smith &

Wesson 9 Sigma?
A.

Ah, yeah.

He told me that was the gun that

supposedly did the—
Q.

Okay.

And did he also say to you that "How can they

find the gun when it was burned up?"
A.

Yeah.

That came up one time in a conversation.

Q,

Did Jordan state that after the shooting he and his

girlfriend went to Cortez or went some place?
A.

Urn, no.

he put it?
Q.

He never said that.

He said—oh, how did

Oh—that they had split up.

Let me go into another question.

Did—did Jordan

demonstrate to you how he had used the firearm—
A.

Yes.

Q.

— i n committing what he told you was the act against
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

James Eaton?

2

A.

3
4
5

Urn, he didn't actually say thatfs what he did.

He

said that fs what they said he did.
Q.

Did you demonstrate—did you demonstrate how he

showed you that?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

Show us what you demonstrated.

8

A.

I was told that he, urn—

9

Q.

Jordan told you this and he showed you this.

10

A.

And he told me that; that they said that he did it

11

like—he \Aias going like that.
(Indicated)

12
13
14

I demonstrated it to the officer.

Q.

Did he show you what the body looked like when it

was being shot?

15

A.

Yeah, pretty much.

16

Q.

Show me what you showed Grayson Redd.

17

A.

Just that his body was shakin1.

18

Q.

Why don't you stand up and show me?

19

A.

Just that when the bullets hit, he was going like

20

that—(Indicated)

21
22
23

—like in a vibrating motion.
Q.

When you stood up and did that a moment ago, you

24

showed the hands in front of your chest; is that the way he

25

shewed you?
J. M. LIDDELL
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Q.

Um-hm.

Yeah.

And he showed you that the person was going back and

forth as he was being shot?
A.

Yeah.

Well not back and forth.

He just said he

moved.
Q.

Did you indicate to Grayson Redd—did you use the

words that he vibrated?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

And while he was doing that, did he use a gun like

this with the hand?

Turn it sideways?

(Indicated)
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

That was two different conversation.
In the other conversation did he do this?

(Indicated)
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did Jordan Calliham show you the area on the body of

the victim where he was shot?
A.

Urn, he said it was in this area.
(Indicated)

Q.

How did he do that?

A.

Just showed me.

Q.

Show me how he showed you.

A.

He just said that it was just like in this area.
(Indicated)

Q.

Now Mr. Raso, the statements that we have just
J.
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1

talked about, you gave in an interview to Grayson Redd.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And are those statements as we have described them

4

true?

5

oath?

6

You're saying that that is your testimony today under

A.

Yeah.

7

MR. HALLS:

8

MR. McCAUGHEY:

9

No further questions.
No questions.

CROSS EXAMINATION

10

BY MZ. MORGAN:

11

Q.

Mr. Raso, how old are you?

12

A.

Ifm 28.

13

Q.

You have a number of felony convictions on your

14

record; correct?

15

A.

Yes, I do.

16

Q.

Can you go over them with me?

17
18

Do you know how many

felony convictions you have?
A,

Ah, I have exactly—I think I have one conviction.

19

Ifve been charged with several felonies though.

20

sure I only have one conviction.

21

Q.

And what is that conviction for?

22

A.

Burglary of a dwelling.

23

Q.

And when was that?

24

A.

10 years ago—8 years ago—9 years ago.

25

Q.

You shared a room with Jordan; correct?
J. M. LIDDELL

Ifm pretty

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And so if he had legal paper work under his bed like

the preliminary hearing transcript,—
A.

Um-hm.

Q.

—you would have had access to that information,

wouldn't you?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

You were sentenced to do six months?

A.

Um-hm.

Q.

But you didn't do six months, did you?

A.

No.

Q.

You got out right before Christmas, didn't you?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

They let you out early.

A.

Um-hm.

I did almost five.

MZ. MORGAN:

No further questions.

MR. HALLS:

I have no further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You can go.

MR. HALLS:

May this witness be excused?

MR. McCAUGHEY:

Thank you.

Yes.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HALLS:

I call Adrian Killsinsight.

THE COURT:

Is this the last one of these kinds of

witnesses, Mr. Halls?

I'm just wondering about taking a

recess.
J. M. LIDDELL

1

MR. HALLS:

Your Honor—

2

THE COURT:

Is there short witnesses?

MR. HALLS:

It is.

3

not---

4
5

This is a short wi tness.

It

would be a good time to take a recess after this witness.
We've got another one, but I—he's not here.

6
7

We're—we're kind of wondering why.

8

recess, we could—

9

But maybe i f we took a

(Bailiff summoned witness from outside courtroom.)

10
11

I — if it's

THE COURT:

Raise your righthand here and take the

oath.

12

ADRIAN KILLSINSIGHT

13

called by the Plaintiff, having been duly

14

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

15

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

16

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be

17

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help

18

you God?

19

THE WITNESS: Yes.

20

THE COURT:

Sit over here.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

21

BY MR. HALLS:

22
23

Q.

State

24

A.

Adrian Killsinsight.

25

Q.

Where do you live?

state your name and where you reside?

J. M. LIDDELL

1

A.

In Blanding.

2

Q.

Adrian, are you a former resident of this county

3

facility at the jail here?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

You were here for awhile?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

Were you—were you here for a felony?

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

What was the felony?

10

A.

Burglary and theft.

11

Q.

Were you housed in the same cellblock or the same

12

housing unit as Jordan Calliham?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

During the time that you were housed in the same

15

cellblock with Mr. Calliham did he make statements about why

16

he was in the San Juan County Jail?

17

A.

Oh, yeah.

18

Q.

Okay.

And you heard—you heard some of these

19

statements and you've given those statements to Grayson Redd;

20

is that correct?

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

Did you make that statement to Grayson Redd within

23

the last couple of weeks?

24

A.

Urn, y e a h .

25

Q.

Adrian, did you tell Grayson Redd that Jordan stated
J. M. LIDDELL

that he had killed the victim?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you state that Jordan stated that he had went

into the woods and shot him up?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did you demonstrate to Grayson Redd how he held his

hand—
A.

Yes.

Q.

— i n telling you what he had done?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Would you demonstrate that for the jury.

A.

He went like this and this—
(Indicated).

—like he shot off, urn, bullets.
Q.

The first thing is he puts his hand like this—
(Indicated)

—and then he turns it sideways—
A.

Yeah.

Q.

—and does this motion?
(Indicated)

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Ah, did Jordan state to you or did you make this

statement to Grayson Redd that he capped him because he owed
him $300 for coke?
A.

Yeah.
J. M. LIDDELL
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1

Q-

Did you make the statement to Grayson Redd that

2

Jordan stated that he had tortured him, that he had shot him

3

up?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

And are those statements statements that were made

6
7

by Jordan Calliham to you, personally?
A.

Yeah.

8

MR. HALLS:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

9

MR. McCAUGHEY:

No questions.

10

MR. HALLS: Ah,--

11

MZ. MORGAN:

12

MR. HALLS:

13

We've got time.

All right.
CROSS EXAMINATION

14
15

I'm fine.

BY MZ. MORGAN:
Q.

Your bunk was next to Jordan's; correct?

16

(Witness nodded affirmative.)

17

So you would have had ample access to any legal

18

paper work that he may have had; right?

19

A.

Yeah.

20

Q.

So you didn't read the information he had under his

21

Could have.

But I didn't.

bed about this case.

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

When you first talked to the officer, you said that,

24

urn, what Jordan had stated was that he was supposed to have

25

killed the boy and then the officer encouraged you to tell
J . M. LIDDELL
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more and then you changed your story and said, "Well he said
hefd killed the boy;" is that correct?
A.

No.

Q.

So if thatfs what the officers report says, the

officer has made a mistake.
A.

Yeah.
MZ. MORGAN:

Okay.

No further questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HALLS:
Q.

Adrian,—

A.

Yeah.

Q.

—you were reluctant to come here to testify today,

weren't you?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

You didn't want to do that.

A.

No.

Q.

At one point, when you started talking tcJ Grayson

Redd, you told him that you didn't know anything about it,
didn't you?
A.

Um-hm.

Q.

But you do. Are the statements that you've made

here today that we just went through that you got from Jordan
Shumway—Jordan—excuse me.

Jordan Shumway is somebody I grew

up with, so Jordan Calliham.

Are those statements that you've

made?
J. M. LIDDELL
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A.

Yeah.

Q.

Did he make those?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

You heard them?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

He made them to you?

A.

Yeah.
MR. HALLS:

Nothing further.

THE COURT:

Step down.

MR. HALLS:

May this witness be excused, Your Honor?

MR. McCAUGHEY:
MZ. MORGAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Yes.

No objection.
All right.

This witness is excused.

We'll take a 15-minute recess.

Members of the jury,

during that recess don't discuss this case with anyone.
allow anyone to discuss this it in your presence.

Don't

Don't make

up your mind as to any issue until it's finally submitted to
you for decision.

We'll be in recess.

(Recess)
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT
THE COURT:

The record will show members of the jury

are present, counsel are present, the defendants are present.
Mr. Halls, your next witness.
MR. HALLS:

Your Honor, what I need to indicate to

the Court is that I've got a couple of more witnesses that I
J. M. LIDDELL

